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NOTE
HORSESHOES AND HAND GRENADES: THE
DODD-FRANK ACT'S (ALMOST) ATTACK ON
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis' that culminated in panic in 2008 has brought
both Wall Street and Main Street to their knees. 2 Three of the largest
Wall Street investment banks collapsed in a span of six months.3
Housing prices in the United States dropped by an average of 18.5% in
twenty major cities by the end of November 2008. 4 By year-end 2008,

1. The "economic crisis" referred to throughout this Note spans from 2008 to present, but
there were signs of weaknesses in the financial markets as early as the summer of 2007. See Kevin
Warsh, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Council of Institutional
Investors 2009 Spring Meeting: The Panic of 2008 (Apr. 6, 2009), http://federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/warsh20090406a.htm ("[The panic of 2008] manifested itself in the summer of
2007. Asset-backed commercial paper markets seized up in the United States and abroad.
Commercial banks lost confidence in each other, putting pressure on overnight London interbank
offered rates.").
2. See David Anderson & Sarah Hodges, Credit CrisisLitigation:An Overview of lssues and
Outcomes, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., June 2009, at 1, 1 (discussing the collapse and
acquisition of Bear Steams by JPMorgan Chase in March 2008, the seizure of IndyMac Bank--one
of the nation's largest savings and loans banks-by the federal government, and the rescue of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which at the time guaranteed or owned approximately half of the
country's mortgages).
3. See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2008, at Al (explaining the impact on the global markets because of the rushed sale of Merrill
Lynch & Co. and the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc.); Robin Sidel et al., J.P.
Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, As Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008,
at Al (describing the "fire-sale" of Bear Steams).
4. US. Housing Prices Down 18.5%, NYC Almost 10%, BROWNSTONER (Feb. 25, 2009, 9:00
AM), http://www.brownstoner.com/brownstoner/archives/2009/02/us-housingpric.php ("Property
values in the 20 biggest U.S. cities fell an average of 18.5 percent in the year end[ing] November
2008, bringing house prices down almost 30 percent and back to late-2003 levels."). See also Kevin
Quealy, Home Prices in Selected Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.
con/interactive/2008/12/04/business/economy/HOUSINGPRICESGRAPHIC.htmi (providing the
Standard & Poor's/Case-Shiller twenty-city housing index).
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the unemployment rate had reached 7.2%, a 2.3% increase from yearend 2007, and a 2.7% increase from year-end 2006.'
The crisis prompted the federal government into action. In 2008, the
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") was signed into law and
permitted the U.S. Treasury to purchase or insure the assets of financial
institutions.6 Also in 2008, the federal government nationalized home7
mortgage giants Fannie Mae ("Fannie") and Freddie Mac ("Freddie").
While such drastic measures were implemented during the Bush
administration, likewise, the Obama administration took action to curtail
the faltering economy. In February 2009, Congress enacted and
President Barak Obama signed into law the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act ("ARRA"),8 a $787 billion economic stimulus plan
that provided tax relief to both small businesses and individuals, and
expanded unemployment and welfare benefits. 9 On July 21, 2010,
President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the "Act" or the "Dodd-Frank Act")' 0 into
law. The Dodd-Frank Act is the most sweeping financial regulation
passed in recent history and reflects the most substantial change to
financial regulation since the 1930s.'" The Dodd-Frank Act affects
virtually all financial institutions, both large and small, 12 and while few
5. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 09-0004, THE
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: DECEMBER 2008, at 1-3 (2009) (reporting the unemployment rate at 7.2%
in December 2008); see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 08-0013, THE
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: DECEMBER 2007, at 1-2 (2008) (reporting the unemployment rate at 5.0%
in December 2007); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 07-0003, THE
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: DECEMBER 2006, at 1-2 (2007) (reporting the unemployment rate at
4.5% in December 2006).
6. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(a)(l), 122
Stat. 3765, 3767.
7. See, e.g., James R. Hagerty et al., US. Seizes Mortgage Giants: Government Ousts CEOs
of Fannie, Freddie; Promises Up to $200 Billion in Capital, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at Al
("[T]he U.S. government seized two of the nation's largest financial companies, taking direct
responsibility for [Fannie and Freddie] that provide funding for around three-quarters of new home
mortgages.").
8. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
9. The Recovery Act, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/TheAct.aspx
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011). In 2011, the expenditure figures for ARRA were increased to $840
billion to conform to President Obama's budget and Congressional Budget Office changes made
since the passage of the act in 2009. Id.
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
11. Financial Services Reform Alert: Dodd Frank Next Steps .... K&L GATES (Aug. 16,
2010), http://www.klgates.com/dodd-frank-next-steps-08-16-2010/.
12. Summary ofthe Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted
into Law on July 21, 2010, DAVIS POLK, i (July 21, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com/files/
Publication/efb94428-9911-4472-b5dd-006e9c6185bb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/efd835
f6-2014-4a48-832d-00aa2a4e3fdd/070910_FinancialReformSummary.pdf.
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provisions of the Act are effective upon enactment, 13 some of the
begin to affect the marketplace and litigants
regulations will
14
immediately.
Blame for the economic crisis has been placed primarily on the
broad shoulders of private sector actors, public sector regulators,1 5 and
inadequate regulation. 16 Included in the category of such private sector
actors are credit rating agencies or nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations ("NRSROs"). 17 The criticism of credit rating agencies is
not a new phenomenon,18 but the cause of action created against credit
13. Id. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 932(a)(8),
§ 15E(p)(I)(A), 124 Stat. at 1877 (establishing the Office of Credit Ratings to administer the rules
that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("S.E.C.") will establish regarding credit rating
agency regulation). The legislation leaves many regulations up to the agencies that will enforce
provisions of the Act; thus, until the agencies adopt rules related to the various regulations, parts of
the Act will not go into effect immediately. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 12, at i.
14. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 12, at i (explaining both the immediate and long-term impact
of the Act and that the Act was designed to become effective in stages).
15. See Dale Ledbetter, The Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Who, What, Where and
Why... Investigations & Litigation, in UNDERSTANDING THE SUB-PRIME DEBACLE, at 39 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 15783, 2007) (arguing that Wall Street
underwriters played a significant role in growing the subprime market and "abus[ed] borrowers and
investors"). See generally J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist
View of the Causes of the Economic Crisis, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 175 (2010)
[hereinafter Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts] (providing an analysis of the various public sector actors
that contributed to the economic crisis).
16. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE

UNITED STATES xviii, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf (last visited Nov. 11,
2011) (concluding that financial regulators failed and contributed to the instability of the financial
markets). The Financial Crisis Inquiry "Commission was established as part of the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act[, Pub. L. No. 111-21 (2009),] passed by Congress and signed by the
President in May 2009." About the Commission, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, http://www.fcic.
gov/about (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was responsible
for examining the causes of the economic crisis. Id.
17. John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; A Policy Primer
on Proposed, Pending and Possible Credit Rating Reforms 2 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies,
Columbia Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 359, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1650802 ("Broad consensus exists that inflated credit ratings and
conflict-ridden rating processes played a significant role in exacerbating the 2008 financial crisis.").
This Note will refer to credit rating agencies as both credit rating agencies and "NRSROs," although
technically there is a distinction between the two entities. NRSROs are credit rating agencies that
have registered with the S.E.C. as per the requirements outlined in Section 15E of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN
THE COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 4 (2008),
8
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination07080 .pdf [hereinafter
SUMMARY REPORT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES]. The major three credit rating agencies, Moody's
Investor Services, Inc. ("Moody's"), Standard & Poor's Ratings Services ("S & P"), and Fitch
Ratings, Ltd. ("Fitch"), registered as NRSROs with the S.E.C. in September 2007. Id at I.
18. See, e.g., Theresa Nagy, Note, Credit Rating Agencies and the FirstAmendment: Applying
ConstitutionalJournalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 140,
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rating agencies in the Act is extraordinary. Specifically, Sections 931 to
939H of the Act address the regulation of credit rating agencies.1 9
Section 939G of the Act repeals Securities and Exchange Commission
("S.E.C.") Rule 436(g) ("Rule 436(g)"), 20 which provided that ratings
assigned by NRSROs were not part of the registration statement
submitted by issuers under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act"). 21 Because security ratings made by credit rating agencies were not
included in registration statements, the agencies were not subject to
liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act.22 Historically, cases
of
brought against credit rating agencies have been dismissed because
23
the exemption under Rule 436(g) or First Amendment defenses.
The Dodd-Frank Act created a new cause of action against credit
rating agencies, and while a bold change in the face of historical
attempts to shield credit rating agencies from liability,24 it still leaves
litigants in a position to overcome several hurdles. Specifically, while
litigants will not be required to plead loss causation under Section 11,25
credit rating agencies will be permitted to use the absence of loss
causation as an affirmative defense.26 Additionally, the judiciary has

140, 145 (2009) (quoting Representative Henry A. Waxman's statement that "[tihe story of the
credit-rating agencies is the story of a colossal failure" and explaining that the failure of credit rating
agencies has "spurred public outrage, spawned numerous lawsuits, and led to new regulations"
(footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Coffee, supra note 17, at 2.
19. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 931-939H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872-90 (2010).
20. Id. § 939G, 124 Stat. at 1890 ("Rule 436(g), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Act of 1933, shall have no force or effect.").
21. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2011), repealed by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 939G, 124 Stat. at 1890. Rule 436(g) previously exempted credit rating
agencies from including in registration statements "the security rating assigned to a class of debt
securities, a class of convertible debt securities, or a class of preferred stock." Id.
22. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (describing the civil liabilities
associated with filing a false registration statement and specifically creating liability if the
registration statement "contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading").
23. See Blair A. Nicholas & Ian D. Berg, Credit RatingAgencies: Out of Control and in Need
of Reform, SEC. LITIG. & REG.: ANDREWs LITIG. REP., June 30, 2009, at 1, 5, available at
http://www.blbglaw.com/misc-files/SCL1504_CommentaryNicholas.pdf ("[A]ttempts to litigate
around the Section 11 exemption.., have been generally unsuccessful and have created even
greater protections for the rating agencies through judicial precedent."). See also infra Part VI.A.2.
24. See infra Part VI.A.
25. See, e.g., Iowa Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. MF Global, Ltd., 620 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir.
2010) ("To prevail on a § I ... claim, a plaintiff must show that the relevant communication either
misstated or omitted a material fact.").
26. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416,
421 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that "harm suffered by the plaintiffs was not caused by any alleged
fraud of the defendants; rather, it was caused by the direct intervention of the crash of the interet
bubble in the market for which the defendants were not responsible").
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previously resisted attempts to permit private causes of action even in
light of Congress's intent to create such causes of action.27 As a result,
the seemingly aggressive attempt by Congress to reign in credit rating
agencies may fail to make a dent.
This Note addresses the potential effect of the newly-created cause
of action against credit rating agencies attributable to the Dodd-Frank
Act's repeal of Rule 436(g). This Note will also address the potential
(un)success of such claims in light of the loss causation requirement for
securities actions exemplified by the litigation brought after the "Global
Settlement., 28 Part II of this Note explains the economic crisis and
political environment leading up to the passage of the Act. Part II also
describes the federal government's response to the economic crisis, the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the potential success of current
attempts to repeal the legislation.
Part III describes credit rating agencies, the role credit rating
agencies played in the economic downturn, and the reasons why these
agencies were historically exempt from liability under Section 11 of the
Securities Act. Additionally, Part III of this Note details the provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act that relate to the regulation of credit rating
agencies as well as the policy justifications for holding credit rating
agencies liable in light of the economic crisis.
Further, Part IV of this Note provides a brief explanation of the
nature of securities litigation and private causes of action under the
federal securities laws. Part IV also details the impact of loss causation
in causes of action brought under Section 11 of the Securities Act. Part V
details the circumstances surrounding the research analyst and
investment banking conflict of interest litigation that occurred after the
"Global Settlement." Additionally, Part V explains the significance of
loss causation in "Global Settlement" litigation. A review of the "Global
Settlement" is necessary in order to understand the similarities of the
litigation brought during that era and the future litigation that will be
brought as a result of the newly created cause of action against credit
rating agencies in the Dodd-Frank Act.

27. See, e.g., J. Scott Colesanti, The PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did the
"RushedDebate" Really Spell the End of Securities Claims and RICO?, 26 SEC. REG. L.J. 139, 156
(1998) [hereinafter The "Rushed Debate"] ("[W]hether holding that Congress did not contemplate
certain matters or simply did not speak clearly, courts have refused to dismiss pending [Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act of 1971 ("RICO")] claims based solely upon their reading
of the RICO Amendment.").
28. As discussed infra Part V.A., the "Global Settlement" was the culmination of a joint
investigation of various regulators into the conflicts of interest surrounding research analysts and
investment bankers at brokerage finns.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:937

Part VI details previous attempts by investors to hold credit rating
agencies liable prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, including the
types of claims brought by plaintiffs and the typical defenses that were
raised by credit rating agencies. Part VI also examines future attempts to
hold credit rating agencies liable after the Dodd-Frank Act and describes
current litigation involving credit rating agencies. Part VI also briefly
describes measures taken by credit rating agencies against requirements
imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Part VII summarizes the issues with
the newly created cause of action and proposes an amendment to Section
11 of the Securities Act that would better serve the consumer protection
purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act.
II.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

In order to understand the underpinnings of the economic crisis that
have devastated the U.S. economy,2 9 one must understand the investment
vehicles at the heart of the crisis. Section A of this Part explains the role
that subprime mortgages and the resulting collateralized debt obligations
played in the economic decline. Section B will describe the federal
government's response to the economic crisis. Section C details the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the purpose behind the legislation.
For up-to-date commentary on the legislation, Section D describes
efforts to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act.
A.

Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The Crisis of Credit

The subprime mortgage debacle that is central to the current
economic crisis began in the summer of 2007.30 A subprime loan or
mortgage is a loan made to a borrower who has poor credit and would be
disqualified from prime or near-prime mortgages.3 Subprime mortgages
became significant because the loans were bundled and sold as
structured products called collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs").32
The creation of a structured product begins with the formation of a

29.

See Warsh, supranote 1.

30. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 77, 82-83 (discussing that while the increase in subprime mortgage
defaults was noticed in February 2007, it was not until June and July 2007 that the credit market
began to react).
31. Ledbetter, supra note 15, at 39; Subprime Mortgage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.
investopedia.com/terns/s/subprimemortgage.asp (last visited Nov. 11,2011).
32. Brunnermeier, supra note 30, at 77-78 (discussing in detail the shift by banks from the
"traditional banking model" to the "originate and distribute" model that led to banks offloading risk
by creating structured investments such as CDOs (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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portfolio of investments such as mortgages, other loans, or bonds.33 Once
the portfolios are created, the portfolios are sliced into "tranches. ' 34 The
tranches are rated by credit rating agencies and then resold to different
investors based on risk tolerance and differences in credit quality.3 5 The
structure of CDOs permitted many institutional investors to circumvent
regulatory requirements and to hold assets they would have been
prevented from purchasing.36
Equally significant was that the subprime mortgages were bundled
and sold to government-sponsored enterprises ("GSEs") such as Fannie
and Freddie.3 7 Investors purchasing securities issued by Fannie and
Freddie (who had purchased the subprime mortgage bundles or CDOs)
mistakenly believed that the investments were guaranteed because the
government would not permit Fannie and Freddie to become insolvent.38
The availability of CDOs to investors that had previously not invested in
such products and the impression that some of these investments were
guaranteed led to a "flood of cheap credit" and a decrease in the care and
monitoring of loans.39 While investors and banks contributed to the

33. Id. at 78. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives,75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2007) (calling CDOs a "pool of debt contracts").
34. Brunnermeier, supra note 30, at 78. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 33, at 1022. See also
Tranches, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tranches.asp

(last visited Nov. 11,

2011). Tranches are "[a] piece, portion or slice of a deal or structured financing.... [The] portion is
one of several related securities that are offered at the same time but have different risks, rewards
and/or maturities." Id.
35. Brunnermeier, supra note 30, at 78-79 (explaining that the top tranches generally receive
AAA ratings, the highest credit rating for such investments, and the more senior of these tranches
are sold to investors); Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 33, at 1022 ("Credit rating agencies rate the
various tranches ...whose terms vary depending on seniority.").
36. Brunnermeier, supra note 30, at 80 (providing the example that "certain money market
and pension funds that were allowed to invest only in AAA-rated fixed-income securities could now
also invest in a AAA-rated senior tranche of a portfolio constructed from BBB-rated securities").
37. Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts, supra note 15, at 178 (explaining that approximately half
of the mortgages were bundled and sold to GSEs). See, e.g., Who Is Fannie Mae Today?,
FANNIEMAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Nov. 11,
2011); Frequently Asked Questions About Freddie Mac, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.
com/corporate/companyprofile/faqs (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
38. David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REv. 1019, 1042-43 (2008) (arguing
that while the statutory language was clear that securities issued by Fannie and Freddie were not
backed by the federal government, Wall Street believed that the government would not permit
Fannie and Freddie to fail).
39. Brunnermeier, supra note 30, at 82 ("Mortgage brokers offered teaser rates, nodocumentation mortgages, piggyback mortgages.., and NINJA ('no income, no job or assets')
loans."). See also Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in
the CurrentRegulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 227, 232-33 (2009) (explaining that
the complex nature of structured products "resulted in a situation where many security holders [did]
not know the exact nature of the risks" bome by their investments).
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economic crisis, there has been little commentary regarding the
government's role in the economic decline.4 °
On the contrary, the criticism of credit rating agencies and their role
in the economic crisis is more prevalent.4' Specifically, credit rating
agencies were accused of inflating credit ratings on mortgage-backed
securities and then advising Wall Street firms about how to package the
securities in order to obtain higher credit ratings from the credit rating
agencies. 42 The credit rating agencies were paid by investment banks for
both consulting services and for issuing credit ratings, creating at the
43
very least an impression that such conduct was a conflict of interest.
Credit rating agencies have publicly denied such conflicts exist.a
B.

The FederalGovernment's Response to the Economic Crisis

The blame for the economic crisis has been placed on the broad
shoulders of the federal legislature and judiciary, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the S.E.C., and of course, Wall Street
firms gone wild.45 Regardless of where the blame may lie, the federal
government began to respond to the economic crisis in the fall of 2007,

40. See Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts, supra note 15, at 175, 179 (stating that "a pointed
study of the full range of government causes (and their attendant depth) has to date proven less
attractive to authors and critics" and describing the Federal Reserve's role in triggering the growth
of structured products by lowering the interest rate, prompting banks to make loans with less
stringency). But see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 16, at xxi (concluding that the
government may have had a larger role in the crisis than originally thought and finding that the
"government was ill prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty
and panic in the financial markets").
41. Coffee, supra note 17, at 2, 12; see Lynch, supra note 39, at 234, 242 (addressing the
relationship between the credit rating agencies, banks, and investors and arguing that inaccurate
credit ratings fueled the housing market frenzy and created the conditions for the economic crisis).
42. Stephen Labaton, Debt-Rating Agencies Are Under Scrutiny by S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2007, at C4. Then-Chairman of the S.E.C., Christopher Cox, stated that the Commission was
examining whether credit rating agencies violated conflict of interest standards by rating various
mortgage-backed securities and then providing investment firms advice on how to bundle the
investments in order to gamer higher credit ratings. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id. S & P's executive vice president, Vickie A. Tillman, was quoted as saying that while
"'[s]ome have questioned whether the "issuer pays" model has led S.&P. and others to issue higher,
or less rigorously analyzed, ratings so as to gamer more business. There is no evidence-none at
all-to support this contention with respect to S.&P. "' 1d. Head of the asset-backed finance rating
group at Moody's, Michael Kanef, was quoted as saying that "'[t]he integrity and objectivity of our
rating processes is of utmost importance to us .... Our continued reputation for objective and
independent ratings is essential to our role in the marketplace."' Id.
45. Ledbetter, supra note 15, at 39 (arguing that Wall Street underwriters played a significant
role in growing the subprime market and "abusing borrowers and investors"). See generally Laws,
Sausages, andBailouts, supra note 15, at 177 (suggesting and listing the various public sector actors
that contributed to the economic crisis).
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albeit in a more laissez-faire fashion under the Bush administration.4 6 In
an effort to increase the federal government's response, the Democratcontrolled Congress introduced various legislation related to mortgage
reform.4 7 In October 2008, Congress passed, and President George W.
Bush signed, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 48 that has been
dubbed the financial "bailout" plan.49 The law authorized the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury to purchase up to $700 billion in distressed
assets through TARP.50 Mortgage-backed securities and CDOs were
eligible for purchase by the Treasury. 5 TARP was initially intended to
"clean up the balance sheets of the largest [financial] institutions," but
instead, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson directed the Treasury to "start
injecting capital" into financial institutions by purchasing preferred
stock. 52 The Federal Reserve played a critical role as well by providing
liquidity to investment banks, and by rescuing Bear Steams and
American International Group. 3
The congressional response to the economic crisis continued under
the Obama administration and in July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act was
signed into law. 54 While the Dodd-Frank Act was reactionary in the
sense that the law was implemented in response to the economic crisis,
among the Act's stated goals are "to protect the American taxpayer" and
46. See Joshua Wirth, Note, FederalRegulation and Legislation in the Wake of the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown: A Legal PhilosophicalAnalysis of FederalGovernment Responses to Market
Bubbles, 14 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 179, 186-87 (2008) (chronicling the Bush administration's
position that the market would correct itself, however, the administration publicly encouraged: (1)
changes to the Federal Housing Administration, (2) reform of the federal tax code to protect those
mortgagers whose debt was forgiven, (3) a "foreclosure avoidance initiative," and (4) transparency
and reliability in the mortgage market (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47. See id at 191-93, 196-97 (describing in detail the various legislation introduced by
Congressmen Christopher Dodd, Barney Frank, Bradley Miller, and Harry Reid).
48. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
49. See Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upperfor Finance,87 WASH. U. L. REv. 1213, 1218 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted) ("Congress and the White House first agreed on a stopgap
financial 'bailout' plan early in October 2008.").
50. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3767 (authorizing the
establishment of TARP to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions); Hockett, supra note
49, at 1218 (explaining that TARP's "sheer size" of over $700 billion was "unprecedented").
51. David Goldman, CNNMoney.com's Bailout Tracker, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.
com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (detailing the
various funds committed and invested by the federal government during the economic crisis,
including funds to repurchase CDOs from American International Group).
52. David Gaffen, The Evolution of TARP in the Strugglefor Life, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2009,
11:46 AM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2009/02/09/the-evolution-of-tarp-in-the-strugglefor-life/ (describing the "various iterations of the TARP").
53. Randall D. Guynn, The Global FinancialCrisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010
BYU L. REv. 421, 435.
54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
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"to protect consumers." 55 Only time will tell whether the Dodd-Frank
Act will have an impact and whether Congress can achieve the
legislation's stated purpose of consumer protection.5 6
C. The Dodd-FrankAct
The Dodd-Frank Act represents the most significant change to the
regulation of the U.S. financial markets since the Great Depression.57
The swiftness with which the Act was passed is remarkable. The Act
was introduced by Representative Barney Frank on December 2, 2009,
passed in the House of Representatives on December 11, 2009 and in the
Senate on May 20, 2010, and signed by President Obama on July 21,
2010.58 Some critics argue that the Dodd-Frank Act was not passed
quickly enough after the emergence of the economic crisis.5 9
According to President Obama, the legislation was designed to
achieve "clear rules and basic safeguards" for the markets. 60 The
55. Id.pmbl., 124 Stat. at 1376. See also The Monitor: Bank Regulation, BANKING & FIN.
SERVS. POL'Y REP., Aug. 2010, at 34, 34.
56. Financial-RegulatoryReform: The SEC Moving Forward, INVESTMENTNEWS (Oct. 10,
2010, 6:01
AM
ET),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20101010/REG/310109990
[hereinafter Financial-Regulatory Reform] (quoting S.E.C. Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar's
remarks on September 21, 2010 in which he indicated that "[t]he impact of the legislation will not
be known for some time"). The objectives of Congress as expressed in the Dodd-Frank Act will not
come to fruition if Congress does not adequately fund the S.E.C. and other agencies, such as the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, essentially crippling these agencies from being able
implement and enforce the rulemaking provisions of the Act. See Bruce Carton, How Can Congress
Kill Dodd-Frank? By Underfunding It, SEC. DOCKET (Jan. 20, 2011, 7:44 AM),
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2011/01/20/how-can-congress-kill-dodd-frank-by-underfunding-it/
(explaining that the S.E.C.'s budget was kept at its 2010 level even though Chairman of the S.E.C.
Mary Schapiro had requested a significant increase for fiscal year 2011 and a 2009 report issued by
the Government Accountability Office confirmed that the S.E.C. lacked funds to properly bring
enforcement actions). In addition to critics' concerns regarding the over-expansive nature of the
reform, there have been calls to repeal the legislation in its entirety. See Carla Main, Dodd-Frank
Repeal, OCC Bank Probe, Daley Picked: Compliance, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-07/dodd-frank-repeal-occ-bank-probe-daley-pickedcompliance.html (describing Republican Representative Michele Bachmann's introduction of a bill
aimed to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act).
57. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 12, at i; K&L GATES, supranote 11.
58. Bill Summary & Status llth Congress (2009-2010) H.R.4173 Major Congressional
Actions, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 1l:HR04173:@@@R (last
visited Nov. 11, 2011) (providing a summary of all major Congressional actions related to the
Dodd-Frank Act).
59. See Christine Hurt, Dodd-Frank Forum: Bernard Madoff as the Big Idea,
CONGLOMERATE (July 20, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/07/doddfrank-forumbernard-madoff-as-the-theory.html. The author argues that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed
quickly after the "villains" were identified. Id. In the case of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it was the collapse
of Enron and WorldCom that stirred the federal government into action. Id.
The Dodd-Frank Act, on
the other hand, was passed almost two years after the beginning of the economic crisis. Id.
60. The Monitor: Bank Regulation, supra note 55, at 34 (quoting President Obama from the
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legislation sets forth a regulatory framework that includes both
rulemaking requirements, and study and reporting provisions.6' Studies
estimate that the Dodd-Frank Act contains between 240 and 315
rulemaking provisions. 62 The Act covers a broad array of subject matter,
including systemic risk regulation, bank capital, derivatives, deposit
insurance reform, and regulation of credit rating agencies.63
As stated by President Obama, the Act requires the financial system
to adjust to the changes set forth in the Act and regulators are
responsible for ensuring that implemented rules are followed. 64 Though
some regulators have already begun the rulemaking process, 65 other
regulators, such as the S.E.C., have been stalled by the very institutions
they are empowered to regulate.66 Additionally, the S.E.C.'s current
budget may not provide the agency with sufficient funds to implement or
enforce the rules required under the Act. 67 Some commentators have
Dodd-Frank Act signing ceremony on July 21, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. See DAVIS POLK, supranote 12, at i; K&L GATES, supranote 11.
62. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 12, at i (estimating 243 rulemaking provisions and 67
studies); K&L GATES, supra note 11 (estimating 315 rulemaking requirements and 145 studies and
reports).
63. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 931-939H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872-90 (2010) (sections regulating credit rating agencies); DAVIS
POLK, supra note 12, at i ("[B]oth financial institutions and commercial companies must now begin
to deal with the historic shift in U.S. banking, securities, derivatives, executive compensation,
consumer protection and corporate governance that will grow out of the general framework
established by the Act.").
64. The Monitor: Bank Regulation, supra note 55, at 34 ("[F]or the new rules to be effective,
regulators will need to be vigilant. Adjustments may need to be made along the way as the financial
system adapts to the changes .... ).
65. See Patrick Blum, Will New Finance Rules Hurt Energy Industry?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/business/energy-environment/13ihtrentrade.html ("The [Commodity Futures Trading Commission] published its first set of detailed
rules this month....").
66. See, e.g., Letter from Susan J. Thomas, Sec'y & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Ford Motor Credit
Co., to Katherine Hsu, Senior Special Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (July 22, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/fordO722 10-1 120-incoming.pdf (requesting
that the Commission not recommend an enforcement action against Ford Motor Credit Co. because,
in response to the repeal of Rule 43 6(g), several credit rating agencies "have indicated that they are
not willing to provide their consent to the inclusion of their names or ratings in registration
statements or prospectuses until they have had time to assess the implications of such consent"). In
response, the S.E.C. issued a "no-action letter" allowing issuers, such as Ford Motor Credit Co., to
omit credit ratings from registration statements for a period of six months. See Response from
Katherine Hsu, Senior Special Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Office of Chief Counsel, Div.
of Corp. Fin., to Ford Motor Credit Co. (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/201 0/ford072210-1120.htm.
67. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC Budget Woes May Bolster Case for Creation of SRO,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Jan. 2, 2011, 6:01 AM ET), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110102/
REG/301029976 (noting that the S.E.C.'s budget concerns about its ability to adequately enforce the
securities laws existed prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, but in light of the Commission's
new responsibilities, the agency may not be able to effectively implement and enforce provisions of
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suggested that the broad nature of the legislation may impede regulators
in the implementation of the Act.68 As suggested by an S.E.C.
Commissioner, the impact of the legislation depends on the decisions by
regulators.69
Both the expansive nature of the Act and the swiftness with which it
was passed raise concerns about whether Congress adequately
considered the consequences of such a vast reform.7 ° The Act leaves
much of the implementation and enforcement to regulators, but also
leaves the door wide-open for those regulations to be influenced by the
various groups affected by the regulations.71 In short, while the aim of
the Dodd-Frank Act is consumer protection, those protections may not
come to fruition in light of the obstacles the legislation itself imposes in
implementation and logistics. 72 Additionally, failure by Congress to give

more specific direction leaves open the possibility that regulators will
not implement policies in line with the stated consumer protection
objective of the Act.73

the Act).
68. See J. Scott Colesanti, SEC Chiefs Past and Present at Fordham, BUS. L. PROF BLOG
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business-law/2010/09/sec-chiefs-past-andpresent-at-fordham.html ("While guarded in his suggestions, [former S.E.C. Chairman Harvey] Pitt
was pointed in his critiques, noting that the far-reaching Dodd-Frank Act may have 'set up' the
Commission for a fall.").
69. Financial-Regulatory Reform, supra note 56 (quoting S.E.C. Commissioner Luis A.
Aguilar's remarks on September 21, 2010 in which he indicated that the "impact [of the Dodd-Frank
Act] will depend significantly on decisions made by regulators").
70. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2010, at Al ("[The Dodd-Frank Act] is basically a 2,000-page missive to federal
agencies, instructing regulators to address subjects ranging from derivatives trading to document
retention. But it is notably short on specifics, giving regulators significant power to determine its
impact-and giving partisans on both sides a second chance to influence the outcome.").
Additionally, legislation with a clear congressional intent but poor drafting may not produce
anticipated consequences. The "Rushed Debate," supra note 27, at 160 (concluding that a provision
of the [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995] has been "ignored or diluted, despite the
Congress' [sic] clear intent").
71. See Appelbaum, supra note 70, at Al (stating that by giving regulators the power to
implement regulations of the Act, "partisans on both sides [have] a second chance to influence the
outcome").
72. See Carton, supra note 56. Although prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act the
S.E.C. asked for an increase of $182 million for fiscal year 2011 -in an effort to add more full-time
positions and to advance its technology in enforcement, risk-assessment, and market oversight-the
S.E.C.'s 2011 budget was not increased from its 2010 level. Id. The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act
has left the S.E.C. to create more offices, conduct and publish more than sixty-five studies, and
promulgate more than 240 rules within a budget that the S.E.C. deemed inadequate in 2009. See id.
73. See Appelbaum, supra note 70, at Al ("The much-debated prohibition on banks investing
their own money, for example, leaves it up to regulators to set the exact boundaries. Lobbyists for
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and other large banks already are pressing to exclude some kinds of
lucrative trading from that definition.").
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D. CurrentAttempts to Repeal the Dodd-FrankAct
Some members of Congress have discussed repealing portions of
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Senate has voted to repeal at least one
provision of the Act.74 After the Republican takeover of the House of
Representatives in the November 2010 election,7 5 some Republican
leaders indicated a desire to repeal the entire Act.76 In January 2011,
Representative Michele Bachmann introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives that would repeal the Dodd-Frank Act." While a repeal
of the Act may be on the horizon, the financial industry is more
optimistic that a "technical corrections bill" will be passed in order to
effectuate the implementation of the Act, but that a total repeal is not
imminent. 7 ' Even if the Dodd-Frank Act is repealed, the economic crisis
has stirred discussions regarding the credit ratings industry, its impact on
the financial markets, and an appropriate regulatory scheme.79
74. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy on Senate
Passage of Bill to Repeal SEC FOIA Exemptions (Sept. 21, 2010), http://leahy.senate.gov/
press/press releases/release/?id=502e5f2c-88ca-430a-8dd4-d1377cd15298 (explaining the Senate's
adoption of S. 3717, legislation to repeal exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act for the
S.E.C. that were included in the Dodd-Frank Act, and urging the House of Representatives to pass
the legislation).
75. See Republicans Win House Majority, Make Senate Gains in Wave Election,
FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/02/poll-closing-key-eastcoast-races-balance-power-line/.
76. See Stefan J. Padfield, Is a Repeal of Dodd-Frank Looming?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Oct.
23,
2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2010/10/is-a-repeal-of-dodd-franklooming.html (citing a President Obama radio address in which the President discussed the stated
intentions of Republican leaders in the Senate to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act and noting that the
Republican radio address of Senator John Thune "did nothing to dispel [the] notion.., that
Democrats spent their time passing more and more burdensome regulations, like their so-called
Financial Reform bill that failed to address the main cause of our economic mess" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
77. To Repeal the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 87,
112th Cong. (2011). While a repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act appears imminent, the proposed
legislation is similar to the House of Representative's repeal of the Democrats' health care reform
measures, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, passed in March 2010. See David M. Herszenhom & Robert Pear, As
Vowed, House Votes to Repeal Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at Al. The Democratcontrolled Senate has indicated that it will not act on the health care repeal legislation. Id. ("Leaders
of the Democratic-controlled Senate have said that they will not act on the repeal measure,
effectively scuttling it."). The bill to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act may face a similar fate in the
Senate.
78. See Ben White, What Does GOP Takeover Mean for Dodd-Frank?, POLrICO (Nov. 4,
2010, 5:13 AM), http://www.politico.com/momingmoney/1110/momingmoney268.html (quoting
Ken Bentsen, head of Wall Street trade group SIFMA's D.C. office). Mr. Bentsen stated that
"[t]here was always the likelihood that there would be some form of technical corrections bill.
That's not unprecedented when it comes to mammoth pieces of legislation. There are some
questions about whether some of the provisions can work as enacted." Id.
79. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 17, at 2. While there is consensus that credit rating agencies
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REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES

The regulation of credit rating agencies is not a new phenomenon,
but an understanding of the way credit rating agencies operate is
instrumental to understanding how these agencies have been regulated
by the federal government. Section A briefly outlines how credit rating
agencies operate. Section B describes the role that credit rating agencies
played in the economic crisis that rocked the United States. Section C
describes previous attempts by the federal government to regulate credit
rating agencies. Section D describes the Dodd-Frank Act provisions
specifically targeting credit rating agencies. While Section D, and more
importantly this Note, focuses on Section 939G of the Dodd-Frank Act
and the corresponding liability created under Section 11 of the Securities
Act, the discussion is incomplete without at least an overview of the
general provisions of Section 933. Finally, Section E offers policy
justifications for creating liability against credit rating agencies in light
of the economic crisis.
A.

The Nuts andBolts of Credit RatingAgencies

Credit rating agencies are for-profit, private companies that assess
the creditworthiness of issuers of debt as well as rate debt instruments.8 °
While there are more than one hundred credit rating agencies
worldwide, 81 in the United States, three agencies control the industry-,
Moody's Investor Services, Inc. ("Moody's"), Standard & Poor's

played a role in the economic crisis, "reformers divide between (1) those who want to subject [credit
rating agencies] to closer regulation to purge the rating process of conflicts of interest, and (2) those
who believe that the answer is deregulation through downsizing the role of credit ratings." Id.at 18.
80. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 5 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf [hereinafter ROLE AND FUNCTION OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES]. For an in-depth discussion of credit rating agencies, see generally
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Richard M. Levich et al. eds.,

2002). Credit rating agencies are statutorily defined as:
[A]ny person (A) engaged in the business of issuing credit ratings on the Internet or
through another readily accessible means, for free or for a reasonable fee, but does not
include a commercial credit reporting company; (B) employing either a quantitative or
qualitative model, or both, to determine credit ratings; and (C) receiving fees from either
issuers, investors, or other market participants, or a combination thereof.
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(61).
81.

BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of

Credit Quality Information 14 (Bank of Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbswp3.htm.
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Ratings Services ("S & P"), and Fitch Ratings, Ltd. ("Fitch").82 The
securities issuers provide the credit rating agencies with information that
is not publicly available so that the credit rating agencies can rate their
securities." The issuers of the debt pay rating agencies to rate the
issuers' securities, and this process of payment by the issuers is known
as the "issuer-pays" model.84 Once the credit rating agencies have
analyzed the information provided by the securities issuers, the credit
rating agencies make their ratings publicly available.8 5 Credit rating
agencies not only rate the securities upon issuance but also monitor the
investment and revise credit ratings as necessary.8 6 Critics argue that the
"issuer-pays" model creates conflicts of interest and played a significant
87
role in the economic crisis.

82. Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 43 (2004) ("The
major rating agencies-Moody's Investor Services, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch-rate debt
instruments and companies."). See also SUMMARY REPORT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra
note 17, at 1 (describing the S.E.C.'s examination of Moody's, S & P, and Fitch, to review their role
in the economic crisis).
83. See ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 80, at 26. Credit
rating agencies consider, among other things, various information regarding securities issuers such
as: (1) the issuer's method of cash generation and its use of cash, (2) the nature and amount of the
issuer's assets and liabilities, (3) the issuer's debt-to-equity ratios, (4) interest coverage ratios, (5)
cash flow predictions, (6) business projections, (7) amount and nature of fixed charges, (8) advanced
notification of major corporate events, (9) nature of the issuer's markets, (10) efficiency of
operations, (11) quality of management, (12) contractual commitments, (13) competitors, and (14)
the issuer's regulatory risks. Id. at 26 n.64.
84. Lynch, supra note 39, at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that credit
rating agencies replaced the "subscriber-pays" revenue model with the "issuer-pays" revenue model
beginning in the mid-1970s (internal quotation marks omitted)). Credit rating agencies also rate the
creditworthiness of securities issuers that do not pay for their services. Id. at 240. Such services are
called "unsolicited ratings" and are based upon publicly available information. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
85. See ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 80, at 21-22
(describing the method by which credit rating agencies collect and analyze information in order to
determine a rating for a security).
86. Id. at 27. Generally, securities are rated using a letter-designated grade that represents the
credit rating agency's opinion that the debt issued will be repaid. See, e.g., Standard & Poor's
Ratings Definitions, STANDARD & POOR'S (Apr. 27, 2011, 16:09:53 EST), http://www.standardand
poors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetlD-1245303711350. S & P's long-term issue credit ratings
are based on a scale of AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, and D, with plus (+) and minus (-)
within each of the ratings indicating relative standing within each category. Id. A security rated
AAA is a security with the lowest default risk-"[t]he obligor's capacity to meet its financial
commitment on the obligation is extremely strong"-and a rating of D represents a security with the
highest default risk--"[a]n obligation.., is in payment default." Id.
87. See Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry, 13
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 263-64 (2010); Coffee, supra note 17, at 2, 30-31. Both articles
reiterate the position that a model that allows issuers to pay credit rating agencies for ratings creates
a strong incentive for credit rating agencies to issue higher ratings regardless of the accuracy of such
ratings. Bai, supra, at 263-64; Coffee, supra note 17, at 2, 30-31.
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The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Economic Crisis

Credit rating agencies played a central role in the subprime
mortgage crisis because they rated subprime securities that entered the
market, which in turn affected the credit ratings of the institutions that
held the investments. 8 Credit rating agencies were able to have such a
significant influence on the markets because credit ratings are the
primary way that investors assess the default risks associated with
securities and issuers.8 9 Credit rating agencies played two key roles in
the economic crisis. First, credit rating agencies advised issuers
regarding the structure of CDOs, rated various tranches, and admitted
they failed to properly assess the credit risks of CDOs. 90 Second, credit
rating agencies failed to manage conflicts of interest between issuers and
the credit rating agencies. 9' The credit rating agencies had the
opportunity to play such a significant role in the economic crisis because
of the S.E.C.'s reluctance to take as active a role in regulating credit
rating agencies
as it has in regulating other actors in the financial
92
markets.
88. See Amanda Bahena, What Role Did Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) Play in the Financial
Crisis?, UNIV. OF IOWA CTR. FOR INT'L FIN. AND DEV., http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/
sites/default/files/CRAs.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). See also Larry P. Ellsworth & Keith V.
Porapaiboon, Credit Rating Agencies in the Spotlight: A New Casualty of the Mortgage Meltdown,
Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 35, 35 (arguing that investors had a "misplaced belief in the
value of residential mortgage-backed securities" and that credit rating agencies produced ratings for
many of the securities that led to the inflated real estate market).
89. See ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 80, at 19 ("The
[S.E.C.] recognized that, in recent years, the importance of credit ratings to investors and other
market participants had increased significantly, impacting an issuer's access to and cost of capital,
the structure of financial transactions, and the ability of fiduciaries and others to make particular
investments."). Rating agencies reduce costs and improve efficiency by allowing "less resource-rich
investors" an opportunity to obtain information about issuers and securities that would otherwise be
unavailable or inaccessible. See Lynch, supra note 39, at 241.
90. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 33, at 1022 ("Credit rating agencies rate the various
tranches... whose terms vary depending on seniority."); Bahena, supra note 88 (explaining that
credit rating agencies: (1) advised issuers how to structure CDOs to maximize profits and failed to
adequately assess the credit risks in CDOs, and (2) failed to manage conflicts of interest in the rating
process).
91. Bahena, supra note 88 (describing that the conflicts of interest were caused by: (1)
relationship conflicts, (2) issuer-paid ratings, and (3) advising issuers on how to structure CDOs to
get the highest ratings).
92. See Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts, supra note 15, at 212 ("[The Commission], uneasy
with a supervisory role it inherited by default, simply shunned final action [on credit agency
regulation] until it was ordered by Congress" via the passage of the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act of 2006.). In fact, not until September 2007 were Moody's, S & P, and Fitch subject to the
S.E.C.'s regulations for credit rating agencies. SuMMARY REPORT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES,
supra note 17, at 1. Prior to 2007, and generally from 1975 to 2006, Moody's and S & P (and more
recently Fitch) were subject to the S.E.C.'s regulations through a requirement that institutional
investors and broker-dealers who wished to hold debt securities in their portfolios obtain ratings for

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss4/6

16

Grinshteyn: Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: The Dodd-Frank Act's (Almost) Attac

2011]

HORSESHOES AND HAND GRENADES

C. Previous Attempts to Regulate Credit Rating Agencies
While credit rating agencies have played a significant role in the
financial industry in the past decade,93 prior to the enactment of the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (the "Rating Agency Reform
Act"), 94 the agencies were largely unregulated. 95 The 2006 regulation
was a response to the collapse of several large and well-rated companies,
namely Enron and WorldCom, and its purpose is to regulate the credit
rating industry in order to prevent similar incidents.96 The Rating
Agency Reform Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") to include Section 15E.97 Section 15E provides for the
registration of NRSROs 9 8upon submission of various documents and
information to the S.E.C.
While the Rating Agency Reform Act gave the S.E.C. power to
restrict conflicts of interest, even requiring information and
documentation from the credit rating agencies regarding the existence of
such conflicts, the legislation specifically prohibited the S.E.C. from

such debt. Coffee, supra note 17, at 19. The institutional investors and broker-dealers could only
rely on ratings from NRSROs for these regulatory purposes. Id. Further, the S.E.C. did not formally
establish criteria to determine which credit rating agencies were deemed to be NRSROs. Id. During
the period from 1975 to 2006, the S.E.C. refused almost all applications from credit rating agencies
to be registered as NRSROs. Id.
93. See ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 80, at 19.
94. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 780-7).
95. Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts, supra note 15, at 212 (stating that from 2003 to 2006, "the
SEC did nothing tangible in response to the comments" the Commission received when it requested
public comment regarding credit agency rules).
96. Lynch, supra note 39, at 267-68. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 pmbl.,
120 Stat. at 1327 (stating that the purpose of the act is "[t]o improve ratings quality for the
protection of investors"). While both Moody's and S & P downgraded their ratings of Enron,
Enron's ratings remained above investment-grade days before the company went bankrupt. See
Amy Borrus et al., The Credit-Raters: How They Work and How They Might Work Better,
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 38, 38. As a result, critics argued that the credit rating agencies did
not do enough to obtain accurate information from Enron in order to make an informed decision
regarding the company's credit rating. Id. at 40. S & P countered that its ratings were coupled with
public warnings that Enron's rating would be lowered to junk status if a proposed merger was not
completed. Id. Enron remained at investment grade until just four days before it declared
bankruptcy. Id. at 38.
97. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 4(a), 120 Stat. at 1329. See also SUMMARY REPORT
OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 17, at 4 ("The Act created a new Section 15E of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... ").
98. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(A)-(B) (listing the
various requirements that must be met by a credit rating agency electing to be treated as an NRSRO,
including submission of various information to the S.E.C., but not limited to performance
measurement statistics, procedures and methodologies in determining credit rating agencies, policies
and procedures adopted to prevent misuse of material, nonpublic information, and conflicts of
interest relating to the issuance of credit ratings).
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regulating the substance of credit ratings or the policies and procedures
by which credit rating agencies determined credit ratings. 99 Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the S.E.C. continues to have the responsibility of
requiring disclosure and monitoring compliance with its registration
requirements. 00 While the Act does not give the S.E.C. the power to
regulate the substance of credit ratings, the Dodd-Frank Act does
provide the S.E.C. with additional enforcement mechanisms.',
D. Provisions in the Dodd-FrankAct Related to the Regulation of
Credit Rating Agencies
In light of criticisms that credit rating agencies failed to accurately
reflect the risks inherent in complicated structured products such as
CDOs and contributed significantly to the decline in the financial
markets, provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act specifically target those
aspects of the credit rating business that, at least in part, contributed to
the economic crisis.'0 2 While there may be a consensus that credit rating
agencies played a role in the economic crisis, 03 there is less consensus
99. Id. § 78o-7(c)(2).
100. See Credit Rating Agencies, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlightt
dodd-frank/creditratingagencies.shtml (last modified Aug. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Credit Rating
Agencies] ("The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act enhances the SEC's
").
enforcement mechanisms ....
101. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
sec 932(a)(8), § 15E(r), 124 Stat. 1376, 1879 (2010); Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 100
(explaining that the Dodd-Frank Act requires the S.E.C. to adopt, among others, several rules
concerning application and disclosure of credit rating methodologies, form disclosure of data and
assumptions underlying credit ratings, and consistent application of rating symbols and definitions).
102. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 931(5), 124 Stat. at 1872
(explaining that the ratings of structured financial products by credit rating agencies during the
economic crisis were inaccurate and that the "inaccuracy contributed significantly to the
mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors, which in turn adversely impacted the
health of the economy in the United States and around the world"). See also DAVIS POLK, supra
note 12, at 75 ("[C]ritics and regulators have attributed such rating failures to a lack of intemal
controls, conflicts-of-interest inherent in the issuer-pay business model, a lack of transparency and a
perceived absence of accountability for credit rating agencies.... [V]arious commentators have
asserted that the use of credit ratings in U.S. statutes and regulations has contributed to an overreliance on credit ratings and an incorrect assumption that such credit ratings bear an implicit
government seal-of-approval.").
103. The Dodd-Frank Act states:
Because of the systemic importance of credit ratings and the reliance placed on credit
ratings by individual and institutional investors and financial regulators, the activities
and performances of credit rating agencies, including nationally recognized statistical
rating organizations, are matters of national public interest, as credit rating agencies are
central to capital formation, investor confidence, and the efficient performance of the
United States economy.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 931(1), 124 Stat. at 1872. See also
Guynn, supra note 53, at 472 ("Among the many weaknesses identified as contributing to the
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as to the reforms that would prevent such future failures. 0 4 The DoddFrank Act, among other things, requires greater transparency of rating
procedures and methodologies, provides the S.E.C. with greater
enforcement mechanisms, subjects NRSROs to expert liability, and
with a private cause of action against credit rating
provides investors
10 5
agencies.
Sections 931 to 939H of the Dodd-Frank Act relate to the regulation
of credit rating agencies. 10 6 The credit rating agency provisions in the
Act create a regulatory framework that appears to provide the S.E.C.
the credit rating
with increased enforcement power and also subjects
07
agencies to increased liability for their credit ratings.
1. Section 933
Section 933 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a private cause of action
against credit rating agencies by placing statements made by the credit
rating agencies on the same level as "statements made by a registered
public accounting firm or a securities analyst under the securities
laws."10 8 Previously, such statements by credit rating agencies had been
deemed "forward-looking statements" and were exempt from liability
under the safe harbor provision of Section 21E of the Exchange Act. 0 9
Additionally, Section 933 establishes recklessness as the requisite state

financial crisis was the conduct of credit rating agencies, which were blamed for not adequately or
accurately identifying credit risk in their securities ratings."); Coffee, supra note 17, at 2.
104. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 2-3. There appear to be fundamental disagreements
regarding the role credit rating agencies should play in the financial markets. Id. at 2-3. Such
fundamental disagreements are the basis for the variety of reforms. Id. at 3.
105. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 932(a)(8),
§ 15E(p)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1877 (establishing the Office of Credit Ratings within the S.E.C. to
administer rules related to credit rating agencies); DAVIS POLK, supra note 12, at 75 (describing
credit rating agency regulations and noting that the credit rating provisions will "raise costs and
litigation exposure" for credit rating agencies).
106. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 931-939H, 124
Stat. at 1872-90.
107. See DAVIS POLK, supranote 12, at 75.
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 933(a), § 15E(m)(1),
124 Stat. at 1883. See also Dodd-FrankIssue Brief: Requirements Affecting Credit Rating Agencies,
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 2 (Apr. 2011), http://cii.orgfUserFiles/file/resource%20
center/publications/Dodd-Frank%/20-%/o20Requirements/20Affecting/20CRAs.pdf.
109. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supranote 108, at 3; Edward A. Fallone, Section
10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of
Action Under a StructuralistApproach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 86 (explaining that the "statutory
safe harbor" provision for the disclosure of forward-looking statements could not give rise to

liability if: (1) they were made without actual knowledge that they were false or misleading, or (2)
they were accompanied by cautionary statements explaining factors that could keep the forwardlooking statements from being accurate).
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of mind for private causes of action against credit rating agencies. l° As
discussed infra, although the statutory provisions creating a cause of
action against credit rating agencies are likely to meet resistance in the
courts,'1 1 such provisions at the very least enhance the credit rating
agencies' exposure to liability."1 2
2. Section 939G
The Dodd-Frank Act specifically creates a path for private litigants
to pursue causes of action against credit rating agencies. Specifically,
Section 939G of the Act repeals Rule 436(g), 1 3 which provided an
exemption for credit ratings assigned by NRSROs from being included
as part of the registration statement prepared by or certified by a person
under Sections 7 or 11 of the Securities Act." 4 Under the provisions in
Rule 436(g), NRSROs must consent to the inclusion of their credit
ratings on issuer registration statements. 1 5 NRSROs that consent to the
inclusion of their credit ratings on registration statements will be subject
to liability for misrepresentations or omissions under Section 11 of the
Securities Act.'1 6 Liability under Section 11 establishes a private right of
action against credit rating agencies for statements made on registration
statements to the same extent that registered public accountants and

110. As stated in the Dodd-Frank Act:
In the case of an action for money damages brought against a credit rating agency ... it
shall be sufficient, for purposes of pleading any required state of mind in relation to such
action, that the complaint state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the credit rating agency knowingly or recklessly failed [to conduct an investigation
or obtain reasonable verification of facts].
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 933(b)(2), § 21D(b)(2)(B), 124
Stat. at 1883-84.
111. See infra Part VI.B.2.
112. Steven Ramirez, Dodd-Frank VI: Punting on Credit Ratings, CORP. JUST. BLOG (July 27,
2010, 6:46 PM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/07/dodd-frank-vi-punting-on-creditratings.html.
113. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 939G, 124 Stat. at 1890.
114. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2011), repealed by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 939G, 124 Stat. at 1890 (exempting from registration statements "the
security rating assigned to a class of debt securities, a class of convertible debt securities, or a class
of preferred stock by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization"). Section 7 of the
Exchange Act requires registration statements to include the names of individuals that have
consented to preparing or certifying: (1) any part of the registration statement or (2) valuation in
connection with the registration statement. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (2006).
115. DAVIS POLK, supra note 12, at 76 (explaining that an issuer that wishes to include a credit
rating by an NRSRO on its registration statement must obtain the consent of the NRSRO). See 17
C.F.R. § 230.436(b) ("[ljnformation [that] is set forth in the registration statement upon the
authority of or in reliance upon such persons as experts, the written consents of such persons shall
be filed as exhibits to the registration statement.").
116. DAVIS POLK, supranote 12, at 76.
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securities analysts are subject to liability." 17 As discussed infra, credit
rating agencies have not taken kindly to the requirement that they be
named as experts on registration1 8 statements and in fact have refused to
provide their consent to issuers.'
E. Policy Justificationsfor Assessing Liability Against Credit Rating
Agencies
Many critics have expressed animosity toward credit rating
agencies and have pitted them as key players in the economic crisis. 1 9
While most investors and financial institutions sustained losses, credit
rating agencies profited during the economic crisis. 120 The Dodd-Frank
Act acknowledges the importance of credit rating agencies and the
reliance that investors, the markets, and regulators placed on credit
ratings during the economic crisis.' 2' Additionally, the Act reflects the
sentiment that credit rating agencies are "gatekeepers" in the debt market
and should be subject to oversight and accountability much like the
standards of liability that apply to auditors, securities analysts, and
investment bankers. 22 These justifications are the basis for creating a
private right of action against credit rating agencies.
IV.

SECURITIES LITIGATION AND PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION

In order to understand how Section 939G created a private cause of
action against credit rating agencies, an examination of securities
litigation and private causes of action is essential. Section A provides an
overview of private securities fraud actions as created by the federal
securities laws. Section A explains the difference between causes of
action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act ("Section 10(b)")123 and
Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act. One major distinction between
117. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 933(a), § 15E(m), 124
Stat. at 1883 (amending Section 15E(m) of the Exchange Act to establish that the "enforcement and
penalty provisions of this title shall apply to statements made by a credit rating agency in the same
manner and to the same extent as... a registered public accounting firm or a securities analyst").
118. See infra Part VI.C.
119. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 931(5), 124 Stat. at
1872; Coffee, supra note 17, at 2; Ramirez, supra note 112 ("The credit rating agencies played a
central role in the entire subprime debacle .... ").
120. Ramirez, supra note 112 (illustrating that the credit rating agencies profited from the
"very bubble they helped inflate"). Credit rating agencies charge companies that issue securities to
rate investments. See Lynch, supra note 39, at 239-40 (explaining ways in which credit rating
agencies earn profits).
121. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 931(1), 124 Stat. at 1872.
122. Id. § 931(2)-(3), 124 Stat. at 1872 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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the causes of action under these laws is the requirement under Section
10(b) that a plaintiff prove loss causation. While plaintiffs are not
required to prove loss causation in Section 11 and 12 cases, as Section B
explains, the impact of the loss causation defense is sometimes asserted
by defendants in such cases.
A. PrivateSecurities FraudActions Under the FederalSecurities Laws
Private federal securities fraud actions are based upon federal
securities statutes and rules promulgated thereunder.1 24 Courts have held
that investors seeking to hold those who participate in the sale of
securities-i.e., issuers, underwriters, broker-dealers, and the like-have
an implied private cause of action under various provisions of the
securities laws.1 25 Section 10(b) is considered the "catch-all"' 26 antifraud
provision and is the broadest prohibition of fraudulent activities under
the federal securities laws. 127 Congress
has imposed statutory
128
requirements on private causes of action.
In addition to implied causes of action, other provisions of the
federal securities laws provide an express cause of action. Sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act specifically create liability against issuers
and other enumerated parties for making untrue statements of material
124. See, e.g., id.("It shall be unlawful... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive device... in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary...."). See also Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5(b) (2011) ("It shall be unlawful... [t]o
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made.., not misleading ...").
125. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)
("Though the text of the Securities Exchange Act does not provide for a private cause of action for
§ 10(b) violations, the Court has found a right of action implied in the words of the statute and its
implementing regulation." (citing Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971))).
126. Thomas Corcoran, one of the drafters of Section 10(b), referred to the provision as a
"catch-all." Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearingon H.R. 7852 andH.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas Gardiner
Corcoran, Counsel, Reconstruction Finance Corporation). See also Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) ("§ 10(b) is a catchall antifraud provision .. " (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980))).
127. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 392, 463 (1990) ("[Rule lob-5] is as broad as almost any statute, a sort of
long-arm provision in which the SEC forbids everything the statute gives it power to
forbid.... [T]he rule has been given extraordinary prominence, almost eclipsing everything else as
a source of federal securities law at least in the courts." (footnotes omitted)).
128. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2006) (outlining
the requirements for private class actions in violation of the Exchange Act). See also Fallone, supra
note 109, at 81-86 (describing the procedural elements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act).
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fact or omissions in registration statements and prospectuses and
communications. 29 Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, non-issuers
that can be held liable for misstatements include accountants,
underwriters, and individuals who consent to having prepared or
certified any part of the registration statement or certified any report or
valuation used in connection with the registration statement. 3 ° Plaintiffs
can maintain a cause of action under Section 10(b) for fraudulent
misrepresentation even if the conduct is also actionable under
Section 11. 3'
The significant difference for plaintiffs under the various provisions
is the burden to establish each cause of action. Section 11 places a
minimal burden on the plaintiff whereas Section 10(b) carries a heavier
burden. 132 The distinction between the causes of action under Section
10(b) and Section 11 lies in the elements plaintiffs are required to
prove. 33 Plaintiffs seeking to recover under Section 10(b) and alleging a
violation of S.E.C. Rule lOb-5 ("Rule lOb-5") must prove: (1) a material
misrepresentation; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) transaction causation or reliance; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation. 134 A claim under Section 11 requires a
plaintiff to prove: (1) he purchased a registered security either from an
issuer or in an aftermarket following the offering; (2) the defendant is
one of the enumerated parties under the provision, i.e., issuer, director,
or individual providing consent for reviewing or reporting information in
the registration statement; and (3) the registration statement contained an
untrue statement of material fact or omission of material fact. 135

129. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006) (establishing civil liability for
misrepresenting or omitting a material fact in registration statements); id. § 771(a) (establishing civil
liability in connection with misrepresentations in prospectuses and communications).
130. Id. § 77k(a)(4H5). Under the Securities Act, companies are required to disclose
information through registration of securities. Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S.
SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011).
Registration statements are filed with the S.E.C. and provide information regarding a company's
assets, a description of the security for sale, information regarding management, and financial
statements certified by accountants. Id. The registration statements are made available to the public
after the S.E.C. has reviewed the documents to determine that the company has complied with the
registration requirements, however, the S.E.C. does not evaluate the "merits of offerings." Id.
131. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (holding that "the
availability of an express remedy under § 11 of the [Securities Act does not preclude defrauded
purchasers of registered securities from maintaining an action under § 10(b) of the [Exchange]
Act").

132. Id. at 382.
133. See id.
134. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (describing in detail each of the
elements of a cause of action under Section 10(b)).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
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Consequently, plaintiffs bringing a cause of action under Section 11
are not required to allege scienter, reliance, or loss causation. 136 In
Section 11 actions, defendants may raise a due diligence defense 137 or
the absence of loss causation as a mitigation defense 138 against a
plaintiff's claims. The loss causation defense may prove problematic for
plaintiffs seeking to bring claims against credit rating agencies under
Section

11.139

B. Impact of Loss Causation in Section 11 Liability Cases
Plaintiffs seeking to recover losses under Section 10(b) are required
to prove loss causation, in contrast to plaintiffs seeking to recover under
Section 11.140 To avoid liability under Section 11, defendants can assert
the absence of loss causation as an affirmative defense. 141 Loss causation
136. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (2011) (holding
that securities fraud plaintiffs need not plead loss causation to obtain class certification); In re
Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Rombach v. Chang,
355 F.3d 164, 169 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004)).
137. The due diligence defense is statutorily available to non-issuer defendants. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) ("[N]o person, other than the issuer, shall be liable ... as regards [to] any part of
the registration statement purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert [under Section 7 of
the Exchange Act if] ... he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated ....
").
See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382 ("Liability against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute, even
for innocent misstatements. Other defendants bear the burden of demonstrating due
diligence."(footnote omitted)); In re Morgan Stanley, 592 F.3d at 359 n.7 ("[S]ection 11 provides
several due diligence defenses available to non-issuer defendants ....).
138. Defendants may avoid liability for damages based on depreciation in value of the security
that is caused by an event other than the misrepresentations or omissions in the registration
statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). See also Iowa Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. MF Global, Ltd., 620
F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[A]bsence of loss causation is an affirmative defense.... A
causation defense prevails if the defendant 'proves' that an otherwise recoverable loss was not
caused by the alleged misstatement or omission.").
139. See infra Part VI.B.2.
140. See supra Part IV.A.
141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. The court in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
held:
[I]f the loss was caused by an intervening event, like a general fall in the price of Internet
stocks, the chain of causation... is a matter of proof at trial and not to be decided on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. However, when the plaintiff's loss coincides with a
marketwide phenomenon causing comparable losses to other investors, the prospect that
the plaintiff's loss was caused by the fraud decreases ....
396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see
King County v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(denying Moody's and S & P's motion to dismiss claims against them due to the absence of loss
causation because "Lentell does not say that the existence of a market-wide phenomenon necessarily
eliminates a plausible causal connection between plaintiffs' losses and defendants' alleged fraud").
The Court noted however that "[t]his is not to say that the financial crisis cannot break the chain of
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is the causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the
economic loss. 142 In considering loss causation, the U.S. Supreme Court
has taken into consideration "intervening causes," other than the
misrepresentation or omission, which may have caused the decline in
value of the security.1 43 A general market decline, as seen when the
Internet bubble burst in 2000, was commonly used by defendants as an
"intervening cause" to establish the absence of loss causation in "Global
Settlement" litigations. 44
V.

THE "GLOBAL SETTLEMENT" INVOLVING INVESTMENT BANKERS
AND RESEARCH ANALYSTS

Litigation against major players in the financial markets is not a
new phenomenon. In fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some of the
largest Wall Street firms were the center of a major conflict of interest
scandal involving investment bankers and research analysts. The
resulting investigation and settlement by these firms became known as
the "Global Settlement." Section A describes the conflict, investigation,
and eventual settlement between the Wall Street firms and government
actors known as the "Global Settlement." As a result of the information
that was revealed regarding the conflicts of interest between investment
bankers and research analysts at financial firms, private causes of action
ensued. Section B explains the role that judicial interpretation of the loss
causation requirement played in the unsuccess of such private causes of
action against the Wall Street firms.
A.

The "GlobalSettlement"

Conflict of interest concerns involving actors in the financial
markets are anything but a new concept. During the 1990s, research
analysts and investment bankers were "joined at the hip" and as a result,
the research issued by the analysts was less than objective. 145 Research
causation when considered in a different factual context." Id. at 343 n.64.
142. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). Plaintiffs bear the burden of
proving both proximate cause and economic loss. Id. at 346.
143. See id. at 342 (explaining that when a purchaser sells shares before the "relevant truth" is
revealed, "the misrepresentation will not have lead to any loss"). Further, the Court held that even
after the truth is disseminated to the marketplace, and the shares of the security sell at a lower price,
"that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts,
conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower
price." Id.at 342-43.
144. See infra Part V.B.
145. Barbara Moses, They Were Shocked,Shocked: The "Discovery" of Analyst Conflicts on
Wall Street, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 89, 90 (2004).
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analysts study companies that issue securities. 46 Based on the research,
the analysts make recommendations regarding the purchase, sale, or
retention of the securities issued by issuers. 147 Research analysts are
either unaffiliated148 or are considered "sell-side" analysts, employed by
brokerage firms that are the underwriters
for many of the securities the
49
analysts are required to research.1
Both analysts and underwriters of securities benefit from analyst
recommendations that encourage trading in the investments.1 50 Providing
investment banking services, such as underwriting an initial public
offering, tends to be a large source of income for brokerage firms. 151 The
structure of the research analyst and investment banker relationship
created pressure on analysts to recommend stocks based on the needs of
the brokerage firm's investment bankers-issuing "overwhelmingly
positive" research reports that were not always in line with the interests
of the retail investors.152 Additionally, brokerage firms made little effort
146. See FINRA Guide to Understanding Securities Analyst Recommendations, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/Smartlnvesting/AdvancedlnvestingfUnderstandingSecuritiesAnalyst
Recommendations/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) ("Research analysts study companies and
draw on a wealth of industry, economic, and business trend information to help their clients make
better investment decisions.").
147. Moses, supra note 145, at 92. Generally, analysts summarize research reports with a
recommendation for whether an investor should "Buy," "Hold," or "Sell" a security. FINRA, supra
note 146. While the terms used by firms vary, the recommendations include language suggesting
that the investor should purchase, hold on to, or sell the security at issue. Id.
148. FINRA, supra note 146 (explaining that unaffiliated analysts "sell their independent
research to financial or investing institutions, banks, insurance companies, or private investors on a
project or subscription basis").
149. "Sell-side" analysts are those employed by full-service brokerage firms that provide
research to retail clients for free or for a nominal fee. Moses, supra note 145, at 92 (internal
quotation marks omitted). While the brokerage firms provide the research for free or for a nominal
cost, the brokerage firms charge their retail clients for other activities such as investment banking.
Id.
150. FINRA explains:
[M]any analysts work for large financial firms that underwrite securities. An underwriter
acts as an intermediary between the company publicly offering securities and investors
buying the new stock. Even after the initial public offering, or IPO, it may have an
ongoing relationship with the company or own a significant amount of the company's
stock. And it will often stand to benefit from analyst recommendations that would tend to
support the price of or encourage trading in that security.
FINRA, supranote 146.
151. Moses, supra note 145, at 93 (quoting then-acting Chairman of the S.E.C., Laura Unger,
who explained that positive recommendations "can trigger higher trading volumes, resulting in
greater commissions for the firms" (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also FINRA, supranote
146 (explaining the various conflicts of interest that analysts face when offering recommendations
regarding securities).
152. Moses, supra note 145, at 90, 94. See also FINRA, supra note 146 ("[T]he analyst may
feel an incentive not to say or write things that could jeopardize existing or potential client
relationships for their investment banking colleagues."). But see id.("On the other hand, the analyst
may also be more knowledgeable or diligent in his research because his firm did the underwriting.").
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to protect research analysts from investment banking pressure, so much
so that analysts became part of investment banking teams, attempted to
"woo issuers," and were paid based on the profitability of the firm's
investment banking business.' 53 The structure of the research analyst and
investment banker relationship was apparent and yet, regulators and
Congress expressed little to no concern until the Internet bubble burst in
2000.114
In March 2001, almost a year after the NASDAQ closed at an alltime high, 55 a Merrill Lynch & Co. ("Merrill Lynch") customer filed an
arbitration claim against the brokerage firm and one of its research
analysts, Henry Blodget. 156 Merrill Lynch ultimately settled the
The investigation into the research analyst and investment banking conflict of interest revealed that
some sell-side analysts were publicly recommending securities but privately selling the investments.
Moses, supra note 145, at 94 ("[S]ell-side analysts privately derid[ed], [sold], or even short[ed]
securities while recommending the same stock to the investing public.").
153. Moses, supra note 145, at 93-94 (referencing a 2001 S.E.C. survey that found most fullservice brokerage firms participated in such practices).
154. See id. at 97 ("Despite the abundant evidence that something was seriously amiss in the
world of equity analysts, there was little or no effort to fix it so long as the market continued to rise.
No Congressional hearings were held; no significant rulemaking was initiated by the Commission or
the self-regulatory organizations .... "). In June 2000, the NASDAQ Composite Index dropped by
more than 1000 points from its record high closing in March 2000 and by July 2001 had lost another
2000 points. See Statistical Milestones, NASDAQ NEWSROOM, http://quotes.nasdaq.com/aspx/
StatisticalMilestones.aspx (last visited Nov. 11,2011) (reflecting that the NASDAQ Composite hit a
high of 5046.86 on March 9, 2000); June 2000 NASDAQ 100 Historical Prices/Charts,
TRADINGCHARTS.COM, http://tfc-charts.w2d.com/historical/ND/2000/6/linewchart.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2011) (reflecting that the NASDAQ hit 3800 in June 2000); 2001 NASDAQ 100 Historical
Prices/Charts,TRADINGCHARTS.COM, http://futures.tradingcharts.com/historicalVND/2001/0/contin
uous.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (reflecting that the NASDAQ dropped to 1800 in July 2001).
In April 2002, after a ten-month long investigation, N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer initiated a
Martin Act proceeding against Merrill Lynch Research Analyst Henry Blodget and others. Moses,
supra note 145, at 99-100. Also in April 2002, after Attorney General Spitzer announced his Martin
Act proceeding, the S.E.C., National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), and New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") announced a joint investigation with Attorney General Spitzer into
research analysts and potential conflicts of interest. Id. at 102.
155. NASDAQ NEWSROOM, supranote 154.
156. Charles Gasparino, All-Star Analyst FacesArbitration After Internet Picks Hit the Skids,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at C18. Debases Kanjilal filed an arbitration with the NYSE against
Merrill Lynch and Henry Blodget alleging that he purchased shares of InfoSpace Inc. through
Merrill Lynch and continued to hold the position due to Mr. Blodget's "buy" recommendation. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Kanjilal stated that while he wanted to sell his shares when
they began to decline in value, his Merrill Lynch broker recommended that he hold the shares
because of a conversation the broker allegedly had with Mr. Blodget. See id. Additionally, Mr.
Kanjilal alleged that Mr. Blodget was motivated to provide optimistic projections for InfoSpace Inc.
because Merrill Lynch's investment banking department was the financial adviser for another
company, Go2Net Inc., which InfoSpace Inc. purchased. Id. Mr. Kanjilal claimed that had the price
of InfoSpace Inc. declined before the acquisition of Go2Net Inc., the transaction may have been
"jeopardized." See id. Further, Mr. Kanjilal claimed that "[Mr.] Blodget's recommendations lacked
a reasonable basis in fact and [Mr.] Blodget failed to disclose a serious conflict of interest with the
company whose stock he was touting." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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matter.157 While Merrill Lynch may have quelled one fire, only a few
months later, N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer began investigating
Merrill Lynch's investment banking group for "compromis[ing] the
objectivity of the firm's [research] analysts."' 158 In April 2002, Attorney
General Spitzer announced a Martin Act proceeding 59 against Merrill
the Attorney
Lynch. 160 Within weeks of announcing the investigation,
16
General reached a settlement with Merrill Lynch.'
Other Wall Street firms, while not the first to face scrutiny by
regulators, soon became the subject of a joint investigation by the S.E.C.,
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), and the N.Y. Attorney General. 62 The
regulators alleged that investment bankers had an undue influence on
securities research at brokerage firms. 163 The joint investigation
culminated in what is now called the "Global Settlement."' 164 In addition
157. Merrill Lynch and Mr. Blodget settled the matter in July 2001. See Charles Gasparino,
Merrill Is Paying in Wake of Analyst's Call on Tech Stock, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2001, at Cl.
Merrill Lynch publicly stated that it settled the matter with Mr. Kanjilal to "avoid the expense and
distraction of protracted litigation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Moses, supra note 145, at 100. The investigation was based upon a review of Merrill
Lynch's internal emails which revealed that several analysts expressed "uncomplimentary views"
regarding the investments they recommended as "buy" positions. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
159. Id. The Martin Act, a N.Y. securities statute, is intended to prevent fraud in connection
with the sale of securities. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-353 (McKinney 1996). The N.Y. Attorney
General has the power to commence an action and to order a trial court to direct respondents to
appear and produce documents. Id. §§ 353-354.
160. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Stock Rating
System Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest (Apr. 8, 2002), http://www.ag.ny.gov/
mediacenter/2002/apr/aprO8b 02.html (announcing a court order requiring Merrill Lynch to "make
disclosures to investors about its relationship with investment banking clients" pursuant to the
Martin Act).
161. Moses, supra note 145, at 101. Merrill Lynch agreed to, among other things, pay a $100
million civil penalty, make detailed disclosures regarding ties between the investment banking
department and the research analysts, and set up a Research Recommendation Committee whose
function was to monitor the work of its analysts for objectivity. Id.; see also Stipulation at 3, 7, 9-10,
12, Eliot Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch, No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 21, 2002), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/investorprotection/pdfs/merrill agreement.pdf.
162. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA,
NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices; $1.4
Billion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm.
163. Id.
164. Id. See also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Ten of Nation's Top Investment
Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment
Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm [hereinafter Press Release for
Enforcement Actions Against Investment Firms] (announcing the finalized "[G]lobal [S]ettlement"
with ten Wall Street firms). The "Global Settlement" involved some of the largest Wall Street firms,
including Bear Steams & Co. Inc.; Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Lehman Brothers Inc.; Morgan Stanley
& Co.; Merrill Lynch; J.P. Morgan Securities Inc.; and UBS Warburg LLC. Id.
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to almost $1.4 billion in penalties and disgorgement, the firms were
required to alter future practices related to their investment banking and
research businesses. 65 Approximately $387.5 million paid by firms
in
other than Merrill Lynch was placed in a fund for customer benefit
66
resolution of actions brought by the S.E.C., NASD, and NYSE. 1
While the "Global Settlement" included an investor restitution fund,
the settlement did not bar private civil lawsuits against the firms by
customers harmed by the conflicts of interest. 167 In fact, the N.Y.
Attorney General touted that his office had "made public the information
that [investors] need to bring a lawsuit."' 168 By November 2002, Merrill
Lynch was facing over 150 arbitrations based primarily on research
analyst conflicts.' 69 Plaintiffs, while presumably provided with the
information to bring lawsuits against brokerage firms and research
analysts, still faced70 difficulty in establishing loss causation in analystconflict litigation. 1
B.

Loss Causationin "Global Settlement" Litigation

Analyst-conflict cases were generally brought under Section 10(b)
and plaintiffs alleged that the research reports published by the
defendants were materially false or misleading. 171 Plaintiffs alleged that
because of the misleading research analyst reports, the market price for

165. See Press Release for Enforcement Actions Against Investment Firms, supra note 165
(requiring separation of the investment banking and research departments at the firms as well as the
review of research). Further, the firms were required to take measures to insulate research analysts
from future undue influence by investment bankers in the following ways: (1) physically separating
the departments; (2) requiring senior management to determine the research budget without input
from investment bankers; (3) prohibiting any investment banking role in evaluating analysts or
determining their compensation; and (4) requiring the managers of the research group alone to make
all decisions to initiate or terminate company-specific coverage. Id.
166. Id.
167. Moses, supra note 145, at 103-04.
168. Interview by Hedrick Smith with Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. State Attorney Gen. (Apr. 16, 2003)
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/interviews/
spitzer.html). Additionally, the Attorney General stated that "the information will let [investors] go
to court and say, 'You lied to me, gave me fraudulent advice. Now pay up."' Id.
169. Moses, supra note 145, at 104.
170. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416,
421 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the "harm suffered by the plaintiffs was not caused by any
alleged fraud of the defendants; rather, it was caused by the direct intervention of the crash of the
intemet bubble in the market for which the defendants were not responsible").
171. See, e.g., Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., 263 F.R.D. 90, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (alleging that
the defendants issued false and misleading analyst reports in violation of Section 10(b)). See Moses,
supra note 145, at 104 ("Typically, the analyst-conflict class actions are brought under SEC Rule
1Ob-5, which prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.").
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the securities they purchased was artificially inflated, and the investors
were injured because of the disparity between the inflated transaction
The analystprice and the actual value of the security in question.'
conflict posed a difficult scenario for plaintiffs seeking to establish that
misrepresentations by the defendants caused the inflation of the stock
and that upon revealing the truth, the stock price declined and caused an
economic loss. 17 3 The N.Y. Attorney General commenced the Martin
Act proceeding against Merrill Lynch in April 2002, but the prices of
Internet stocks (the securities generally at issue in the analyst-conflict
complaints) began to decline after the Internet bubble burst in 2000.174
Consequently, Senior District Judge Milton Pollack of the Southern
District of New York held that the general decline of the market due to
the Internet bubble was a sufficient "intervening cause" to warrant the
dismissal of several consolidated analyst-conflict cases against Merrill
Lynch. 75 As a result, while the N.Y. Attorney General may have

172. See, e.g., Fogarazzo, 263 F.R.D. at 95 (alleging that because defendants issued false and
misleading analyst reports on RSL Communications, Inc. ("RSL"), the market price of RSL was
artificially inflated, and purchasers of the investment were injured as a result); In re Merrill Lynch &
Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (alleging that because of misrepresentations and omissions by the
defendants, the price of the securities were artificially inflated, creating a disparity between the
purchase price and the market value of the investments).
173. See Moses, supra note 145, at 108-09. Proving loss causation for analyst-research conflict
cases proved difficult:
The situation is somewhat more complicated, however, in the world of analyst-research
conflict litigation. In most such cases, the prices of the stocks at issue began dropping
when the Internet bubble burst in 2000-two years before Merrill Lynch's internal
emails were made public.., and three years before similar materials from other firms
were released in connection with the Global Settlement.
Id.
174. Id. at 109.
175. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 422 ("Where there is no proximate
cause for the loss sustained other than the direct intervention of a market collapse, that collapse will
govem on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss."). Judge Pollack's holding was significant because
most of the analyst-conflict cases were heard by district court judges in the Southern District of New
York. See Moses, supra note 145, at 110-11 (describing the cases heard by judges in the Southern
District of New York). But see Demarco v. Lehman Bros., 309 F. Supp. 2d 631, 636-37 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (denying defendant broker-dealer's motion to dismiss in part because plaintiff investors had
sufficiently pled that in October 2000, when "the market was finally apprised of the negative
information [regarding the analyst-conflict], the stock declined, causing the losses"). The court
makes no mention of the market decline associated with the Internet bubble. See id. Merrill Lynch
later settled some of the consolidated cases against it relating to the analyst-conflict after the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161,
164 (2d Cir. 2005). See also In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., No. 02 MDL
1484(JFK), 2007 WL 313474, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2007) ("In 2005, following the Second
Circuit's decision in Lentell, the parties began to conduct settlement negotiations."). In Lentell, the
Second Circuit upheld the district court's holding that plaintiffs failed to plead that the
misrepresentations and omissions caused the losses. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 164.
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intended to provide plaintiffs with enough information to succeed in
claims against the broker-dealers in analyst-conflict cases, the courts still
held the proverbial "key 1to
the castle" with respect to whether or not
76
proceed.
could
cases
such
VI.

LITIGATION AGAINST CREDIT RATING AGENCIES

Litigants have been unsuccessful in their attempts to bring private
causes of action against credit rating agencies. Section A describes both
the claims brought by litigants against credit rating agencies as well as
the defenses the credit rating agencies raised in response to such claims.
Section B explains future attempts to hold credit rating agencies liable.
Additionally, Section C outlines the steps taken by the credit rating
agencies to oppose the registration requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.
A.

Attempts to Hold Credit Rating Agencies Liable Priorto the DoddFrankAct

Prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, credit rating agencies
were exempt from liability under the Securities Act through the
promulgation of Rule 436(g). 177 If Rule 436(g) had not exempted credit
rating agencies from liability, plaintiffs seeking to find credit rating
agencies liable would have ideally brought causes of action under
Section 11.178 The exemption was significant because the federal laws
are chock-full of rating-dependent laws and regulations. 179 While credit
rating agencies were statutorily shielded from Section 11 liability,
plaintiffs attempted to hold credit rating agencies liable under other

176. See, e.g., In re MerrillLynch & Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 422 (dismissing investors' claims
against Merrill Lynch because investors were unable to tie their losses directly to the
misrepresentations made by the research analysts).
177. See supra Part III.D.2.
178. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2006) (creating civil liability for untrue
statements of material fact in registration statements by persons who have "prepared or certified any
part of the registration statement, or... prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used
in connection with the registration statement").
179. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act states that corporate debt securities are
not investment grade unless they are rated in one of the four highest categories by at least one
NRSRO. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 183le(d)(4)(A) (2006). Additionally, S.E.C.
rules regarding minimum capital requirements of broker-dealers were based on NRSRO ratings until
the S.E.C. adopted amendments to several rules referencing NRSROs. SeeRules andFormsat Issue
in Removal of References to NRSRO Credit Ratings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.

gov/news/press/2009/2009-200-rulesformsaffected.htm (last modified Sept. 18, 2009).
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theories. 180 Plaintiffs have generally been unsuccessful8 in holding credit
rating agencies liable under other theories of liability.' 1
1. Types of Claims Brought Against Credit Rating Agencies
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, plaintiffs generally
brought claims against credit rating agencies for fraud in violation of
federal securities laws such as Rule lOb-5 82 and state tort law.' 83 For
example, in In re Moody's Corp. Securities Litigation,184 class action
plaintiffs alleged that the credit rating agency made material
misrepresentations and omissions in public statements regarding
180. In Abu Dhabi Commerical Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., two institutional investors
brought a class action against the investment bank and credit rating agencies Moody's and S & P
(who rated the investment as a "condition precedent to purchase") under theories of common law
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and
other contract claims. 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Some plaintiffs have brought
claims against credit rating agencies under Section 1l(a)(5) as "underwriter[s]" rather than experts.
See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 495, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
aff'd sub nom. In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (alleging
that the offering documents for the mortgage-backed securities at issue did not disclose that the
credit rating agencies had "largely determined the composition of the securitized pool of loans" and
that there were conflicts of interest between the issuer, Lehman Brothers, and the credit rating
agencies). Other plaintiffs have brought claims alleging violations of Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., In re
Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (alleging that Moody's
made false statements regarding its independence from the issuers and made misrepresentations in
statements regarding the integrity of the rating agency's ratings).
181. Courts have held that credit rating agencies are not "underwriters":
The Rating Agencies' alleged activities may well have had a good deal to do with the
composition and characteristics of the pools of mortgage loans and the credit
enhancements of the [investments at issue] that ultimately were sold. But there is nothing
in the complaint to suggest that [the credit rating agencies] participated in the relevant
"undertaking ....
In re Lehman Bros., 681 F. Supp. 2d at 499. See also Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331,
332, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that reliance on ratings was unreasonable because the plaintiff,
a majority shareholder in two small banks, failed to show that he was a third-party beneficiary of the
contract between the issuer and the credit rating agency); First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's
Corp., 869 F.2d 175, 176, 178-79 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs, investors and an investment
advisory firm, could not recover damages caused by their reliance on a misrepresentation in the
credit rating agency's publication but the court refused to reach the issue of whether the rating
agencies would be liable under a First Amendment analysis). See also Thomas J. Pate, Triple-A
Ratings Stench: May the Credit Rating Agencies Be Held Accountable?, 14 BARRY L. REV. 25, 44
(20 10) ("Most of the past cases brought against [credit rating agencies] have failed on the basis of
the argument that they are members of the press and that their ratings are protected under the
heightened actual malice standard."). The First Amendment defense raised by credit rating agencies
is discussed infra Part VI.A.2.
182. See, e.g., In re Moody's Corp., 599 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (bringing claims of material
misrepresentations and omissions in public statements under Rule 1Ob-5).
183. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 163 (bringing claims of common law fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and related
claims such as unjust enrichment and aiding and abetting).
184. 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Moody's business and independence, the meaning of the agency's credit
ratings, and the methodology of Moody's credit ratings. 85 The court
denied the credit rating agency's motion to dismiss the claims and held
that the question of an "intervening cause" was a matter for trial.186
Subsequently, upon plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, the court held
that the there was no time within the class period where the alleged
misrepresentations by the credit rating agency caused a "statistically
significant" increase in price. 187
Some plaintiffs have attempted to hold credit rating agencies liable
under the "underwriter" provision of Section 11.188 In 2010, Judge
Kaplan of the Southern District of New York held in In re Lehman Bros.
Securities & ERISA Litigation'89 that credit rating agencies are not
underwriters under the statutory definition of the term and, as a result,
were not liable under Section 11.190 Plaintiffs brought a class action suit
against Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. ("Lehman"), Moody's, and
S & P for over ninety offerings involving mortgage-backed securities
pooled together and sold to a common law trust.' 91 The securities were
registered with the S.E.C. as required and prospectuses and prospectus
supplements (the "Offering Documents") were also filed with the
S.E.C. 9 2 Plaintiffs alleged that information contained in the Offering
Documents were materially false and misleading. 193 With respect to the
claims against Moody's and S & P, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that
the Offering Documents failed to disclose that the credit rating agencies
had played a significant role in determining the composition of the pool

185. Id. at 499.
186. Id. at 513-14.
187. In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 274 F.R.D. 480, 484, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The
defendants bore the burden of "sever[ing] the link between the alleged misrepresentation and the
price" in order to "rebut the presumption of reliance" upon the misrepresentations. Id. at 490.
188. See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff'dsub nom. In re Lehman Bros. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2011).
189. 681 F. Supp. 2d 495,499 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
190. Id. at 498-99. The statute defines "underwriter" as:
[A]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct
or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in
the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term shall not
include a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer
not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l 1) (2006).
191. In re Lehman Bros., 681 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97.
192. Id. at497.
193. Id.
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undisclosed conflicts of interest
of loans and that there were material
94
between Lehman and the agencies.
Judge Kaplan held that while the efforts of the credit rating
agencies were necessary for Lehman to issue the mortgage-backed
securities, the complaint failed to establish that the credit rating agencies
were underwriters who had purchased the securities "from the issuer
with a view to their resale."' 95 The honorable jurist emphasized that
"[m]any actors, quite likely including the Rating Agencies, contributed
to the catastrophe" of the mortgage-backed securities market collapse,
but held that the responsibility for the court was to "compare this
liability on the particular legal theories
complaint with the law governing
196
plaintiffs."'
the
by
selected
Judge Kaplan's decision was made in February 2010, prior to the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the newly created cause of action
against credit rating agencies. As a result, his holding does not foreclose
the possibility that credit rating agencies will be held liable in the future,
or at the very least that plaintiffs will seek to hold the credit rating
agencies liable under Section 11.197 One of the most significant obstacles
to plaintiffs bringing suits against credit rating agencies under Section 11
will be the ability of defendants to assert the absence of loss causation as
to the broker-dealer defendants in the
an affirmative defense,1 98 similar
99
"Global Settlement" litigation.
2. Non-Mitigation Defenses Raised by Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies have generally been successful in asserting
various defenses to claims by investors seeking to hold them accountable
for their ratings.2 °° Credit rating agencies raise integrity defenses,
including: (1) the reputation defense; and (2) the First Amendment

194. Id.
195. Id. at 498-99 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs also claimed that the credit
rating agencies should be held liable under Section 12(a)(2) as sellers. Id. at 499. Judge Kaplan
found that the argument was unpersuasive in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter v.
Dahl, holding that seller liability under the provision was reserved for those that "pass title or
'successfully solicit[] the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial
interests or those of the securities owner."' Id. at 499-500 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647
(1988)).
196. Id. at 501.
197. See infra Part VI.B.2.
198. See supra Part IV.B.
199. See supra Part V.B.
200. See Sherrie R. Savett, Plaintiffs' Vision of Securities Litigation: Current Trends and
Strategies, in SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2010, at 523, 565 (PLI

Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 23726, 2010) (explaining that credit rating
agencies have been able to avoid liability by asserting legal defenses).
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defense. 20 1 Litigation brought against credit rating agencies has generally
failed based on the argument that the agencies are members of the press
and their ratings are opinions, thus protected under the First
202
Amendment.20 2 Under New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,203 ratings issued
by credit rating agencies may be protected under a heightened malice
standard.20 4 While the defense is generally successful, at least one court
has attempted to make a distinction between solicited and unsolicited
ratings. 20 5 Additionally, the Second Circuit found that the credit rating
agency's "fairly active role... in commenting on proposed transactions
and offering suggestions about how to model the transactions to reach
the desired ratings" warranted a holding that the credit rating agency was
not protected under the First Amendment.20 6 Additionally, some
commentators suggest that the First Amendment defense will not 2be7
successful in cases brought as a result of the subprime mortgage crisis. 0
B. Future Attempts to Hold CreditRating Agencies Liable
As discussed, Section 939G of the Dodd-Frank Act has opened a
potential path for litigants to bring private causes of action against credit
201. See David J. Grais & Kostas D. Katsiris, Not "The World's Shortest Editorial": Why the
First Amendment Does Not Shield the Rating Agencies from Liability for Over-Rating CDOs,
BLOOMBERG L. REP., Nov. 12, 2007, at 40, 40 (explaining the First Amendment defense); Lynch,
supra note 39, at 250 (explaining the reputation defense).
202. See Pate, supra note 181, at 44-46 (describing the First Amendment cases involving credit
rating agencies). Credit rating agencies have argued:
[T]hat their ratings are "opinions" with regard to the creditworthiness of the rated entity
and thus are protected by the First Amendment. This view is shared by leading experts
on the U.S. Constitution who believe that credit rating agencies are protected so long as
they are not paid to write positive reviews (as opposed to reviews generally), and so long
as they are communicating to the public rather than to a few private subscribers or to a
particular entity that hires them to give individualized advice.
Bai, supranote 87, at 287 (footnotes omitted).
203. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
204. See id at 283; Pate, supra note 181, at 44.
205. See Pate, supra note 181, at 45. The author discussed CommercialFinancialServices v.
Arthur Andersen, where the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect the credit rating
agency because the issuer had requested the rating and the agency had a "duty of care to provide
accurate ratings." Id. (citing Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 112
(Okla. Civ. App. 2004)).
206. Grais & Katsiris, supra note 201, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. See, e.g., id. at 44 (concluding that the level of a credit rating agency's involvement in
structuring a security may place a credit rating agency in the position of losing a First Amendment
defense). But see Karen Gullo, Ratings by Moody's, Fitch, S&P Ruled to Be Protected Speech,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2010, 12:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-10/moody-sfitch-s-p-ratings-are-protected-speech-california-judge-rules.html (describing the recent dismissal of
a case against the credit rating agencies under state law freedom of speech protections where the
plaintiffs alleged that the ratings of structured investments in the California Public Employees'
Retirement System were "wildly inaccurate" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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rating agencies. 211 While the Dodd-Frank Act may have statutorily
created a cause of action for litigants, the ability for such cases to move
forward remains in the hands of the judiciary.
1. The Impact of Section 11 Liability After the Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act, by permitting credit rating agencies to be held
liable under Section 11, has opened a previously foreclosed avenue for
plaintiffs to hold rating agencies liable.20 9 The Act statutorily enhanced
liability of credit rating agencies by repealing Rule 436(g).2 10 Credit
rating agencies, as non-issuer defendants, will still be able to assert
various affirmative defenses such as due diligence and loss causation.2 11
While the Act creates a new private cause of action, it remains to be seen
whether the judiciary will in fact adhere to the statutorily created cause
of action.2 12
2. Judicial Reaction to Section 11 Liability against Credit Rating
Agencies: Students of History or Pioneers?
While plaintiffs will not be required to plead loss causation in
actions brought under Section 11,213 as demonstrated in litigation
brought as a result of the "Global Settlement," it may be difficult for
plaintiffs to prove that their losses were caused by misstatements or
omissions on registration statements rather than
the overall decline in the
214
market stemming from the economic crisis.
In In re Moody's, the credit rating agency very explicitly raised the
"intervening cause" defense. 2 15 According to Moody's, plaintiffs made
"scarce mention of the collapse of the structured finance market" and
argued that the judge was permitted to take "judicial notice" of the
208. See supra Part II.D.2.
209. See supra Part III.D.2.
210. Coffee, supranote 17, at 27; see supra Part III.D.2.
211. See supra Part 1V.B.
212. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 27 (arguing that while the Act enhances liability for credit
rating agencies: "a Constitutional question mark still hangs over this area that could nullify this new
liability provision"). Specifically, credit rating agencies will likely continue to argue that their
ratings are opinions protected under the First Amendment and may be successful. See, e.g., Gullo,
supra note 207 (discussing a December 2010 case against Moody's, S & P, and Fitch that was
dismissed under a state freedom of speech law).
213. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (2006) (listing the requirements for
liability but not requiring "loss causation"). See text accompanying note 136.
214. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416,
421 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[H]arm suffered by the plaintiffs was not caused by any alleged fraud of the
defendants; rather, it was caused by the direct intervention of the crash of the internet bubble in the
market for which the defendants were not responsible.").
215. Memorandum of Law of Defendants, at 19, In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp.
2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 1:07-CV-8375-SWK).
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decline in the market, 216 exactly as the court had done in In re Merrill
Lynch & Co. 217 Moody's argued that the collapse of the structured
finance market caused plaintiffs' losses.218 Moody's also argued that the
plaintiffs' failed to allege a correlation between the misrepresentation
and the decline of the investment, and as a result, "only the intervening
2 19
cause, the burst of the [market] bubble," could account for such losses.
In 2010, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New
York specifically discussed the "intervening cause" of the economic
crisis in her holding in King County, Washington v. IKB Deutsche
IndustriebankAG.22 ° Judge Scheindlin refused to dismiss claims by two
institutional investors against Moody's, S & P, and Fitch, who rated the
structured investment vehicle Rhinebridge. 221 The investors alleged that
the credit rating agencies had fraudulently misrepresented the value of
Rhinebridge between June 2007 and October 2007 by assigning the
Rhinebridge Senior Notes high credit ratings.222 Plaintiffs alleged that
the high credit ratings concealed that Rhinebridge consisted of "toxic
assets that were heavily concentrated in the structured finance and
subprime mortgage industries and thus likely to default., 22 3 After issuing
high credit ratings to the Senior Notes, the credit rating agencies
downgraded the Senior Notes to "junk" status and, as a result, those
holding the notes suffered millions in damages.224
The credit rating agencies claimed that the credit crisis, not risk
concealed by creditworthy ratings, caused the plaintiffs' losses.225 Judge
Scheindlin discussed at length the "Global Settlement" litigation that
focused on the marketwide decline when the Internet bubble burst in
2000.226 While holding that the plaintiffs did not fail to plead loss
causation because the credit crisis "occurred contemporaneously" with
the "collapse" of the investment, 22227 Judge Scheindlin conceded that the

216. Id. at 11.
217. See In re MerrillLynch & Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 421. See also notes 175-76.
218. Memorandum of Law of Defendants, supra note 215, at 19.
219. Id. at 20 (alteration in the original). Additionally, Moody's cited to cases that occurred
during other downturns in the market where courts held that "intervening causes" were the reason
for plaintiffs' injuries. Id.
220. King County v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 335, 342-44
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. Id. at 335-36, 346.
222. Id. at 336.
223. See id.
224. Id.at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See id.at 340. As part of their defense, the credit rating agencies provided a list of the
various courts that had taken judicial notice of the economic crisis. Id.at 340 n.42.
226. Id.at 342-43.
227. Id.at 343.
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economic crisis may "break the chain of causation when considered in a
different factual context., 228 The ultimate outcome of the case may be
pivotal in future litigation against credit rating agencies. If courts begin
to dismiss claims at the summary judgment phase because of an absence
of loss causation, the statutorily created cause of action under Section 11
against credit rating agencies may be dead on arrival.
C. CreditRating Agencies and Measures Taken Against the New
Dodd-FrankAct RegistrationStatement Requirements
Immediately following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, credit
rating agencies expressed their unwillingness to comply with the
requirement that they consent to being named as experts in registration
statements-significantly affecting the ability of issuers to offer
investments to the market. 229 Further, credit rating agencies have argued
that requiring their consent to use their ratings in registration statements
would have significant consequences, including less disclosure, because
they will refuse to consent to the inclusion. 230 The S.E.C. responded by
permitting asset-backed issuers to omit the ratings disclosure from
prospectuses related to asset-backed securities until January 24, 201 1.231
The S.E.C. has not extended the six-month timeframe for issuers
past the January 24, 2011 deadline and has begun issuing additional
disclosure rules related to asset-backed securities-suggesting that the
agency is moving forward with the rulemaking process related to
markets that affect NRSROs directly.232 As a result, it appears that the
S.E.C. is continuing to take steps to ensure its regulatory hold on credit
rating agencies while the courts begin to determine the extent of liability
that will be imposed on rating agencies through private causes of
action.233
228. Id. at 343 n.64 (discussing other cases that dismissed plaintiffs' complaints for failure to
plead loss causation because the plaintiffs did not adequately show that other circumstances of the
market had not caused the decline in the security price).
229. See, e.g., Letter from Susan J. Thomas, supranote 66.
230. Credit Rating Agency Consents Required for Inclusion of Ratings in Registration
Statements: The Repeal of Rule 43 6(g) and Subsequent SEC Guidance, FRIED FRANK, 1 (Aug. 2,
2010), http://www.friedfrank.conVsiteFiles/Publications/9BBBOD90DC906E7EE3184DDEC4B96
720.pdf. Additionally, credit rating agencies have argued that should they choose to consent to
ratings and that the increased costs of conducting due diligence prior to consent would lead to fewer
offerings. Id. at 2.
231. Response from Katherine Hsu, supranote 66.
232. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Approves New Rules Regulating
Asset-Backed Securities (Jan. 20, 2011), http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-18.htm (explaining
the adoption of two sets of rules encouraging disclosure, including disclosure by NRSROs, in the
asset-backed securities markets).
233. See King County, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
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VII.

RESOLUTION

Congress's attempt through the repeal of Rule 436(g) in the DoddFrank Act to hold credit rating agencies liable in the wake of the
agencies' substantial role in the economic crisis is admirable. The
statutory cause of action, while a commendable first step, must find teeth
in the judiciary in order to make an impact. The statutory language, if
strengthened, may create the cause of action that Congress intended-a
private cause of action that would at least make a dent and one that
would make the courts take notice.
A.

Issues with the New Legislation

While Congress should be applauded for at least attempting to
create a private cause of action against credit rating agencies, the newly
created cause of action may not be a viable method for recovery. While
plaintiffs will not have to prove loss causation for fraud actions brought
under the lower burden of Section 11, credit rating agencies will
inevitably assert loss causation as an affirmative defense.234 Once the
loss causation defense is asserted, plaintiffs will have a difficult time
proving that an "intervening cause," such as the worldwide market
decline, did not cause the plaintiffs damages. 235 As a result, the newly
created cause of action in the Dodd-Frank Act will be ineffective in
establishing a basis for plaintiffs to seek damages against credit rating
agencies. Congressional intent to hold credit rating agencies accountable
in the same manner as auditors, securities analysts, or public accounting
firms falls short if the method for such accountability is unsuccessful.236
B.

ProposedResolution

The Dodd-Frank Act should be amended to provide clearer
guidance with respect to loss causation. To accomplish Congress's intent
to protect investors and hold credit rating agencies liable for their part in
the economic crisis, Section 11 should be amended to include a
234. See supra Part VI.B.2.
235. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416,
420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
236. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (2006) (establishing liability for untrue
statements of material fact or omissions in registration statements against "any person whose
profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement"); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010)
("[C]redit rating agencies are fundamentally commercial in character and should be subject to the
same standards of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and investment
bankers.").
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provision that prohibits credit rating agencies from asserting the absence
of loss causation as an affirmative defense in private causes of action.237
While Section 939G of the Dodd-Frank Act repeals Rule 436(g), an
amendment should be made to Section 11 of the Securities Act to ensure
that the private cause of action created by Dodd-Frank is more than just
words that appear on paper and becomes effective in reality. Currently,
relevant portions of the mitigation defense or "intervening cause" section
of Section 11 of the Securities Act reads as follows:
[I]f the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages
represents other than the depreciation in value of such security
resulting from such part of the registration statement, with respect to
which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
such portion of or all such damages
statements therein not misleading,
2 38
shall not be recoverable.
The following language should be added after "recoverable" in the
above-quoted statutory language to address the loss causation defense
discussed throughout this Note:
In the case of litigation brought against credit rating agencies or
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations under this Section,
the defendant-credit rating agencies or nationally recognized statistical
rating organizations cannot use an intervening cause, such as a general
economic downturn, as a defense to liability.
The above language would accomplish what Congress set out to
establish-a statutorily created 'cause of action against credit rating
agencies under the federal securities laws that cannot be impeded by
credit rating agencies seeking to use the economic downturn as an
affirmative defense-especially when credit rating agencies had such a
significant role in the economic crisis. The amendment, while affording
credit rating agencies the opportunity to assert due diligence or First
Amendment defenses, would prohibit defendants from raising the
mitigation defense that is beginning to create a roadblock for plaintiffs
seeking to recover damages from credit rating agencies for inaccurate
and inflated ratings.23 9

237. See, e.g., In re MerrillLynch & Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 421. Ifjudges were not permitted
to take into account "intervening causes" (such as the world-wide economic crisis), the private cause
of action against credit rating agencies would be more effective in attaining Congress's goal of
holding credit rating agencies accountable in the same manner as other actors in the financial
markets.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
239. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (finding that the economic
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

Enhanced regulation of credit rating agencies and the creation of a
private cause of action against these agencies were inevitable as a result
of their role in the economic crisis. 240 Regulation, however, must be
implemented with an ultimate and attainable goal in mind. 4 1 While
Congress's rush to action in the face of economic turmoil is
commendable, mere action without serious contemplation about the
effects of legislation leads to unintended and sometimes detrimental
242
consequences.
While an increase in litigation related to credit rating agency
liability may seem likely, a historical analysis reveals that the new cause
of action may not yield the intended results.243 As in the cases brought
against brokerage firms related to the "Global Settlement," plaintiffs
bringing claims against credit rating agencies under Section 11 are likely
to have a difficult time responding to the inevitable absence of loss
causation defense that will be raised by credit rating agencies.244 As
history has shown, even when regulators hand plaintiffs the information
necessary to bring causes of action against players in the financial
markets (a la N.Y. Attorney General Spitzer's public comments that his
office had "made public the information that [investors] need to bring a
lawsuit"), 245 it appears that the judiciary will have the ultimate say as to
whether cases under Section 11 against credit rating agencies are
246

successful.

In order to solidify the effect of the private cause of action against
credit rating agencies, Congress should have stated with specificity the
ability of litigants to bring claims against credit rating agencies without

crisis was a sufficient "intervening cause" to prevent recovery by plaintiffs).
240. See supra Part ILA, III.B.
241. See supraPart II.C.
242. See Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Towarda 21st-CenturyRegulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan.
18, 2011, at A17 (discussing the January 18, 2011 Executive Order, titled Improving Regulation and
Regulatory Review, that requires federal agencies to ensure regulations both protect society and
promote economic growth). According to the President, the motivation for the Executive Order was
that "[s]ometimes, those rules have gotten out of balance, placing unreasonable burdens on
business-burdens that have stifled innovation and have had a chilling effect on growth and jobs. At
other times, we have failed to meet our basic responsibility to protect the public interest, leading to
disastrous consequences." 1d.; see supraPart II.C.
243. See, e.g., The "'RushedDebate," supra note 27, at 156 ("[C]ourts have refused to dismiss
pending RICO claims based solely upon their reading of the RICO Amendment" requiring such
dismissal.).
244. See supra Part IV.B.
245. Interview by Hedrick Smith with Eliot Spitzer, supra note 168.
246. See supra VI.B.2.
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permitting loss causation as an affirmative defense.24 7 In light of the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's conclusions that the credit rating
agencies were among the main actors to blame for the economic crisis,248
statutorily restricting the ability for credit rating agencies to use the
worldwide market crash to avoid liability is reasonable.
To resolve this dilemma, Section 11 should be amended to reflect
that the absence of loss causation cannot be used by credit rating
agencies as an affirmative defense.249 Only then will the newly created
cause of action against credit rating agencies have the effect of imposing
liability on those financial actors that played a significant role in the
economic crisis. Until Congress takes additional steps to ensure that the
statutorily created cause of action will accomplish its purpose, the DoddFrank Act will continue to be a game of horseshoes and hand grenades
and "almost" an attack on credit rating agencies.
Allana M Grinshteyn*

247. See supraPart VII.B.
248. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 16, at xxv ("[T]he failures of credit rating
agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction.").
249. See supraPart VII.B.
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